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ABSTRACT 
The Philippine communist revolutionary movement is a historical relic, the 
exception rather than the rule. While much of Asia has opted for capitalism over 
communism, the idea of a workers’ paradise persists within the Philippines’ rural 
heartlands and on university campuses alike. Established over 38 years ago at 
the height of Mao’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the Communist Party 
of the Philippines continues its armed quest for state power. Regarded as the 
longest-running communist insurgency in Asia, the conflict between the 
Philippine government and the communist insurgents has claimed the lives of an 
estimated 40,000+. 
This thesis will examine aspects of the Philippine government, the 
Communist Party of the Philippines, and its armed wing, the New People’s Army 
in an attempt to explain why the Philippine communist insurgency remains a 
serious threat to the government and has not significantly declined in light of a 
long history of democratic rule in the Philippines. Analysis of the Philippine 
communist insurgency will contribute to our overall understanding of why this 
particular communist insurgency has survived where others failed and may 
provide some insight to help the Philippine government identify and construct a 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Over the past 37 years since the CPP was established in 
December 1968 and the NPA three months later in March 1969, the 
armed struggle has caused so much miseries, so much loss of lives 
and damage to properties. 
     - Rose Palacio2 
For too long, the leadership of the revolutionary left has sought 
refuge in a foreign land while commanding and controlling the 
agents of terror in the Philippines engaged in murder, extortion, and 
the use of child soldiers and the deployment of land mines. 
  - Ignacio Bunye, Philippine Presidential Spokesman3 
Against the backdrop of dictatorship, destitution, and U.S. imperial design, 
the Philippines remains the site of a well-publicized and somewhat romanticized 
political struggle carried out by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and 
an armed struggle carried out by the New People’s Army (NPA). Born from 
humble beginnings in 1969, the NPA had emerged by the end of the 1980s at the 
forefront of the most potent revolutionary movement in Southeast Asia.4 To date, 
this persistent insurgency has challenged the linear notion of history as 
embodied in Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” argument as well as the 
triumph of democracy over most communist regimes.5  
While much of Asia has opted for capitalism over communism, the idea of 
a workers’ paradise persists within the Philippines’ rural heartlands and on 
university campuses alike. Regarded as the longest-running communist 
insurgency in Asia, the conflict between the government and the CPP-NPA has 
                                            
2 Rose Palacio, “Sec Dureza asks CPP-NPA to end armed struggle,” Philippine Daily News 
Reader, July 28, 2005, http://www.pia.gov.ph/default.asp?m=12andfi=p050728.htmandno=1 
(accessed January 17, 2007). 
3 Ignacio Bunye, “Raps to expose Joma, CPP-NPA as terrorists,” Gov.Ph News, June 16, 
2006, http://www.gov.ph/news/?i=15440 (accessed January 17, 2007). 
4 Eva-Lotta E. Hedman and John T. Sidel, Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth 
Century (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 1. 
5 For more information, see Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The National Interest, 
no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3-18. 
2 
been going on since 1969, with death toll estimates having surpassed 40,000.6  
Although the number of NPA members has declined in the post-Marcos era, the 
Philippine government’s communist “enemies of the state,” through a blend of 
persuasion and coercion, have managed to weave themselves into the fabric of 
the Philippine civil society. Since the 1980s, thousands of CPP-NPA relationships 
with Philippine officials have slowly neutralized members of the traditional 
economic and political elite. Gregg Jones suggests that the “Spanish, U.S., and 
Japanese…all used the cooptation of the Philippine elite to maintain power, and 
the NPA in its drive to seize power appears to be applying with some success the 
same strategy.”7  
At the domestic level, the Philippines experienced a partial democratic 
transition following the ousting of the Marcos dictatorship, a return to regular 
electoral contests, limited economic growth, and various unevenly successful 
attempts at social reforms such as expanding room for NGOs, legal political 
activities, and greater freedom of the press. Internationally, the demise of 
European communist regimes, the capitalist leanings of the Chinese Communist 
Party, the closure of U.S. bases in the Philippines, and the movement towards 
globalization outside the confines of a single ideological party would seem to 
make an armed communist revolution a hard sell. Such persistence is all the 
more puzzling given that the CPP missed a key opportunity to seize power (or a 
share of it) towards the end of the Marcos dictatorship, underwent violent and 
bloody internal purges, and survived a major internal schism in the early 1990s. 
All of this was happening while the Philippine armed forces were trying, with 
substantial American financial and military support, to exterminate the CPP 
threat. 
The CPP was designated a “foreign terrorist organization” (FTO) on 
August 9, 2002 by the U.S. Department of State. “Manila had lobbied strenuously 
                                            
6 Project Ploughshares, “Philippines-CPP/NPA,” Armed Conflicts Report, January 2006, 
http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-PhilippinesN.html#Deaths (accessed August 
24, 2006). 
7 Gregg R. Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerilla Movement (Boulder, San 
Francisco, London: Westview Press, 1989), 11. 
3 
to have the organization designated as an FTO, although the CPP’s actual terror 
activities have been contained within the Philippines.”8 By May 2003, the 
Philippines had been identified as a major non-NATO ally of the United States 
and both funding and military training began to flow to the Philippines to aid in 
prosecuting the U.S.-initiated Global War on Terror. However, U.S. military 
operations in the Philippines are limited by the Philippine constitution to teaching 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tactics, advising military units, and 
participating in civil-military operations. This leaves the burden of fighting 
terrorists and insurgents resting on the shoulders of the Philippine government 
and armed forces. Officially, the CPP is not the primary target of the government 
campaign against terrorists; rather the targets are Abu Sayyaf, the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front, al-Qaeda, and Jemaah Islamiyah. However, the Philippine Army 
has enhanced its campaign against the CPP within the last several years. This 
leaves the government in a precarious position. With the government focusing its 
attention on fighting both a political and military battle against the CPP and NPA, 
resources allocated to fighting Islamic terrorists are being stretched thin.  
The primary research question this thesis seeks to answer is: Why has the 
Philippine communist insurgency survived for more than three decades and not 
significantly declined in light of a long history of democratic rule? Further analysis 
of the Philippine communist insurgency will contribute to our overall 
understanding of why this particular insurgency has survived where others failed 
and will help the Philippine government identify and construct a 
counterinsurgency strategy to successfully eliminate the Maoist threat. 
Additionally, protecting the Philippine democracy is a U.S. interest and 
understanding why the movement persists is a precondition for designing and 




                                            
8 Noriyuki Gatagiri, “In the Spotlight: The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP),” Center 
for Defense Information, December 17, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/cpp-pr.cfm (accessed 
August 24, 2006). 
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A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature reviewed for this research begins to provide a clearer picture 
of why the Philippine communist insurgency has persisted for more than three 
decades. This literature points to state weakness as a key reason for the 
communist insurgency’s persistence. State weakness is apparent as witnessed 
by weak political parties and contested elections and rampant corruption. 
Additionally, the state’s inability to close the gap between the rich few and the 
many poor has created a permissive environment which the CPP-NPA has been 
able to exploit. The CPP-NPA has thus become the mouthpiece used by the rural 
peasantry to voice their anger and carry on the fight against the Philippine 
government. Finally, there is a relationship of mutual trust that must exist 
between soldiers and the people they serve. In order to sustain strong bonds of 
mutual trust, soldiers must earn the respect of the citizenry through competence 
and fidelity. At the same time, the soldiers must be provided adequate material 
and psychological support to carry out the mission. Right now, the Philippine 
military has the support of the government, but is lacking the necessary tools 
(airlift, transportation, advanced weapons, etc.) required to successfully defeat 
the NPA.  
1. State Weakness 
One of the Philippines’ dilemmas is the state’s persistent inability to 
provide basic services, guarantee peace and order, and foster economic 
development. All of these factors manifest themselves as part of an overall state 
of weakness as indicated by uncollected taxes, uncontrolled corruption, bloated 
bureaucracies, denuded forests, low teacher salaries, and high emigration rates.9 
“State weakness is due in part to a history of state capture by sectoral 
interests.”10 The rural poor demand reform, but the powerful landed elites oppose 
it. In a paper presented at the United States - China Conference on Areas of 
Instability and Emerging Threats, William M. Wise noted that public opinion 
survey data in the Philippines confirms that Filipinos perceive these as very big 
                                            
9 Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines (Lanham, 
Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 1-2. 
10 Ibid. 
5 
problems. “Yet, popular devotion to democratic ideals, strong regional identities, 
family ties, and religious affiliations seem to act as a brake on state failure.” 11 
With that said, this section will highlight several examples of state weakness and 
how these factors have hindered the state’s ability to extinguish the communist 
threat. 
a. Weak Political Parties and Contested Outcomes 
Since coming to office in 2001, President Arroyo has done little to 
shore up Philippine democratic institutions, with political parties remaining weak 
and having had virtually no impact on improving the social and economic 
standards of living. For example, many political parties exist today not because of 
their political ideology, but rather because their leaders’ have an uncanny ability 
to float with the tide. As Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel states,  
when the leaders lose interest in their party affairs or are lured to 
join other groups, their original parties disappear and new ones rise 
up in the horizon. In my country, today, crossing over from one 
party to another can easily be done because the political parties are 
not differentiated by ideologies. They are differentiated only by the 
depths of the pockets of their political leaders and the charisma that 
their financial fortunes create. And sad to say, what passes for their 
political platforms are mainly motherhood statements that have no 
bearing on the real needs of the people.12 
The political platform of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is by no stretch of 
the imagination socially reformist and on-going divisions among ruling elites 
make governance a fragile exercise. In fact, President Arroyo herself crossed 
over from her political party (LDP) to the political party Lakas-NUCD-UMDP-
KAMPI. Additionally, the inability of other leftist parties to constitute a political 
alternative to the control of the CPP on the “far left” agenda has helped the CPP 
maintain its credibility as the voice of the state’s downtrodden rural peasants.  
                                            
11 William M. Wise, “American Perspectives on the Threat Posed by Weak and Failing Asian 
States” (paper presented at The U.S.-China Conference on Areas of Instability and Emerging 
Threats, Beijing, China, February 23-24, 2004):  9. 
12 Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, “Multi-parties Strengthen Democracy” (speech presented at 
the 4th International Conference of Asian Political Parties, Seoul, South Korea, September 8, 
2006), http://www.nenepimentel.org/speeches/20060908_Korea.asp (accessed March 18, 2007). 
6 
One of the major internal concerns of the government is ensuring 
political stability in the wake of the highly contested outcome of the presidential 
election of 2004. During her bid for reelection in 2004, President Arroyo allegedly 
made several calls to election commissioner Garcillano which were recorded via 
wiretaps. Garcillano was believed to be the election official on the tapes talking to 
President Arroyo about rigging the May 2004 elections in favor of Arroyo so that 
she would win by more than 1 million votes.13 The ensuing investigation into 
possible election fraud and tampering became known as the “hello Garci” 
scandal and has called into question the legitimacy of the elected government, 
specifically the office of President. This has ultimately contributed to the 
weakness of the Philippine state.14  
Against the backdrop of threats to her Presidency throughout 2005, 
President Arroyo and her supporters attempted to draw attention away from 
supposed presidential misdeeds to the issues of reforming Philippine political 
institutions and processes. However, December 2005 saw renewed signs of 
opposition-led activity against the president in Congress, and a public opinion 
survey the same month reported that Arroyo experienced the lowest ratings of 
any president since the transition from authoritarian rule in 1986.15 
Weak political parties have ultimately contributed to the persistence 
of the communist insurgency because as politicians switch from one political 
party to the next, campaign promises such as land and road projects go 
unfunded and unfulfilled. This leaves a systematic opening for the CPP-NPA to 
come in to take care of the neglected constituency. For example, “the NPA works 
by approaching farmers and offering instructions on better farming methods, 
improving irrigation, and giving medical aid. Later, discussions are held on the 
                                            
13 Edmer F. Panesa, “Five House Panels Adopt Draft Report on ‘Hello Garci’ Case,” Manila 
Bulletin, March 16, 2006, http://www.mb.com.ph/issues/2006/03/16/MAIN2006031658804.html 
(accessed March 18, 2007). 
14 John L. Linantud, “The 2004 Philippine Elections: Political Change in an Illiberal 
Democracy,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27:1 (April 2005): 80-101 and Bastiaan Van de Loo, 
“The Failure of the Philippine Presidential System,” Asia Europe Journal (2004): 257-269. 
15 Eva-Lotta E, Hedman, “The Philippines in 2005: Old Dynamics, New Conjecture,,”Asian 
Survey 46:1 (January/February 2006): 189. 
7 
rising cost of living and the growing inequities in Philippine society…Exercising 
self-reliance, the peasants and the NPA work together to increase production.”16  
With the media publishing accounts of alleged presidential 
misdeeds, President Arroyo has become mired down in fighting for political 
survival. Instead of focusing on the goals of economic and agrarian reform, the 
President has had to focus her time on ensuring her administration does not 
unravel underneath her. This is seen as a sign of political weakness and possible 
chink in the government’s armor by communist insurgents whose long-term goal 
is the overthrow of the government. Additionally, as more of the Philippine people 
come to view the Presidency as illegitimate, they may be more willing to turn to 
communist agitators as their voice to topple the government they have come to 
view as wrongfully elected and unresponsive to their needs. 
b. Corruption 
A culture of corruption is prevalent at all levels of the state. 
President Arroyo recognizes that corruption has hindered the state’s ability to 
combat insurgency and corruption scandals involving senior military officers have 
affected AFP morale. “The root cause of our situation today is an entrenched 
culture of corruption, Arroyo said. We must collect stolen riches and put people 
on trial for their criminal behavior, whoever they are, wherever they work and 
live.”17  
Graft and greed have always been a part of the Philippines’ military 
with corruption said to be one of the main reasons that the armed forces are 
ineffective in dealing with both domestic and regional terrorism. Philippine 
Congressman Roilo Golez said that 
there is a lot of unhappiness in the region about corruption in the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the chronic inability of the 
armed forces to deal with its internal security issues…corruption [is]  
 
 
                                            
16 E. San Juan, Crisis in the Philippines: The Making of a Revolution (Massachusetts: Bergin 
and Garvey Publishers, 1986), 142-143.  
17 Julie Javellana-Santos, “Corruption Strangling the Philippines: Arroyo,” Arab News, 
http://www.arabnews.com/ (accessed April 7, 2006). 
8 
a ‘major problem’ that affected the country’s ability to counter 
terrorism and protect its territories. It traverses many 
administrations and goes to the highest levels.18  
For example, the so-called “comptroller family” in the Armed Forces has come 
under fire following scandals involving retired Lieutenant General Jacinto Ligot 
and retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia. “Ligot was the AFP deputy chief of 
staff for comptrollership…As J6, he was a member of the board of the AFP 
Retirement Service and Benefit System Fund during the same period, which has 
been investigated for bad deals.19  Garcia replaced Ligot as J6 in March 2001, 
when the latter was named commanding General of the Army’s 2nd infantry 
division in Tanay, Rizal. In December 2005, Garcia was found guilty by a general 
court martial on charges of massive corruption and unexplained wealth. The case 
stemmed from his misdeclaration of his net worth in his statement of assets and 
liabilities for 2002 and 2003, and possession of a “green card” or permanent 
resident status in the United States while still serving as a general in the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines.  
The comptroller’s post was very powerful in the military. Ligot and 
Garcia controlled the handling, programming, and auditing of the budget. 
Because of the system of conversion, they had a lot of leeway in allocating funds. 
Armed Forces chief of staff General Efren Abu has since abolished the position. 
General Efren Abu warned that the military’s preoccupation with the corruption 
scandals could be exploited by enemies of the state and warned that “the 
enemies of the state watch—they watch our every move and threaten to strike at 
the slightest opportunity…those intent on destabilizing and destroying our 
institutions [will] not succeed.”20  
 
 
                                            
18 Carlos H. Conde, “Corruption Troubles Philippine Military,” International Herald Tribune, 
May 26, 2005, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/25/news/phils.php (accessed August 31, 
2006). 
19 Glenda M. Gloria, “A Comptrollers Hidden Wealth,” AsiaViews, (December 2004) 
http://www.asiaviews.org (accessed August 31, 2006). 
20 Ibid. 
9 
c. Poverty and Social Inequality 
With respect to the Philippines, poverty and social inequality have 
created an atmosphere that has contributed to the ongoing insurgency. Aristotle 
noted that: 
The desire of equality, when men think that they are equal to others 
who have more than themselves; or, again, the desire of inequality 
and superiority, when conceiving themselves to be superior they 
think that they have not more but the same or less than their 
inferiors; pretensions which may and may not be just. Inferiors 
revolt in order that they may be equal, and equals that they may be 
superior. Such is the state of mind which creates revolutions.21   
This school of thought holds that as a Cold War relic fighting for communist 
victory, the CPP-NPA are motivated not by Marx, but rather money and the quest 
for equality, with the communist movement remaining viable in part because 
there is money to be made and food to be eaten. Despite its professed Marxist-
Leninist orthodoxy, the CPP-NPA had demonstrated through the years its ability 
to adapt to national political conditions and local situations. Theoretical rigidity 
was shelved for pragmatic politics of survival. 
James Hookway suggests that a lack of infrastructure has 
produced a lack of jobs, which is why relatively few guerillas take advantage of 
government amnesty programs. Simply, there are few other ways to make a 
living. As an example of how lucrative the NPA is as a business, Hookway 
explains that in the Compostela Valley in Mindanao, like other regions in which 
the NPA operates, the rebels collect what they call “revolutionary taxes” from 
local businesses, which the military estimates earn the rebels 300 million pesos a 
year.22  Revolutionary taxes collected by the NPA are crippling rural development 
because residents and business owners in the rural portions of the Philippines 
are moving away in order to seek the relative security of metropolitan areas. 
                                            
21 Aristotle, Politics V, 2, ii, translated by Benjamin Jowett, 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.5.five.html (accessed August 24, 2006). 
22 James, Hookway, “The Business of Terrorism,” Far Eastern Economic Review (January 
16, 2003): 50. 
10 
A prime example of social inequality in the Philippines is that as of 
2003, nearly half of the country’s farmland remained owned by a small handful of 
families who were descendents of Spanish colonizers, half of the working class 
were landless laborers, and land reform had largely floundered. Additionally, 
political levers continue to be held by the landowning Philippine elite who have 
consistently dragged their feet on agrarian reform with the wealthy landowners 
often preferring instead to let their land go to seed rather than see it turned over 
to their tenants.23  By the end of 2005, there had been talk of reform but little real 
progress had taken place in the face of the country’s entrenched problems of 
poverty, social inequality, and indebtedness.  
Under Marcos’ martial law, the communists were able to make life a 
little easier for villagers in areas under their control. Even after Aquino came to 
power in 1986, they were still able to do wonders in their territories by appealing 
to those Filipinos who were no longer enchanted by prospects of reform that 
either never came or were slow to reach the rural areas. Although CPP-NPA 
numbers were reduced significantly following the ouster of Marcos and the lifting 
of martial law, the CPP was still able to win the hearts and minds of the peasant 
working class who grew increasingly disenchanted with the lack of effort to 
increase equality among Philippine citizens. 
d. Military Limitations 
Stoking rural discontent and antigovernment unrest, the CPP and 
the New People’s Army have managed to remain a thorn in the side of the 
military for decades. As violence has escalated during the past several years, 
Philippine military officials have fingered a familiar foe—communist agitators. 
Carlos Conde sums it up best by saying that “the Philippines’ military remains 
fragmented, politicized and corrupt. Its hardware is old and inadequate, its troop 
morale low and its rank and file susceptible to adventurism, as demonstrated by 
                                            
23 For more information, see James, Hookway, “The Business of Terrorism,” Far Eastern 
Economic Review. (January 16, 2003), Simon Montlake, “In capitalist Asia, Philippines still 
grapples with communists,” The Christian Science Monitor, (December 7, 2005), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1207/p04s01-woap.html (accessed May 22, 2006), and Steven 
Rogers, “Philippine Politics and the Rule of Law,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 15, No. 4. (October 
2004): 111-125. 
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numerous coup attempts since the removal of Marcos in 1986.”24 The AFP’s 
limited ability to combat the insurgency due to dissent within the officer corps, 
corruption, lack of training, and insufficient equipment has undoubtedly 
contributed to the persistency of the insurgency. 
Michael Montesano refers to the lack of modern, functional 
equipment and poor coordination between intelligence and operational units as 
key factors for why the AFP has been largely unable to defeat the NPA.25  Also, 
the results of a Joint Defense Assessment between the U.S. Pacific Command 
and the AFP revealed a wide range of weakness in the AFP’s operational 
capabilities, such as a lack of ground mobility and air assault capability, 
intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination, communications equipment, 
and civic action. The joint study also cited large numbers of AFP units that styled 
themselves as special operations with strong implications of unconventionality, 
loose discipline, and accusations among the citizens of human rights violations. 
The report concludes by saying that in addition to improving its equipment, the 
Philippine military needs to reform its organization and structure in order to 
integrate operations and intelligence—and it must deal with perceptions of 
widespread corruption within its ranks.26 Montesano suggests that the 
institutional rot of the AFP is more serious than a mere matter of inadequate 
funding. 
Dissent among the AFP officer corps resulting in coup attempts is 
also not uncommon. For instance, on July 27, 2003 approximately 300 AFP 
officers and soldiers seized a luxury apartment building and the adjacent 
Glorietta shopping mall in Manila. The coup leaders were driven to rebel against 
a system which they claimed was corrupt, sold arms to Muslim rebels, and 
                                            
24 Carlos H. Conde, “Corruption Troubles Philippine Military,” International Herald Tribune, 
May 26, 2005, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/25/news/phils.php. (accessed March 2006). 
25 See Michael J. Montesano, “The Philippines in 2002: Playing Politics, Facing Deficits, and 
Embracing Uncle Sam,” Asian Survey, 43:1 (January/February 2003): 156-166. Michael J. 
Montesano, “The Philippines in 2003: Troubles, None of Them New,” Asian Survey, 44:1 
(January/February 2004): 99-103. 
26 Richard W. Baker and Charles E. Morrison. “Philippines: The Security Environment,” in 
Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2005. ed. Richard Baker (Tokyo, New York: Japan Center for 
International Exchange, 2005), 142-148. 
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perpetuated low pay. The coup plotters also accused AFP senior leadership of 
involvement in the staging of bombings on the island of Mindanao, allegedly to 
draw increased military aid.27  In February 2006, the head of the army’s Scout 
Rangers regiment, Brigadier General Danilo Lim, was accused of leading a plot 
to use the rallies marking 20 years since the fall of President Ferdinand Marcos 
to launch a coup.28   
In 1989, he [Brig Gen Lim] was arrested over an attempted coup 
against then-President Corazon Aquino, who succeeded Marcos. 
The army said he was planning to lead troops to Friday’s protest to 
tell demonstrators that they were withdrawing support  from the 
president, hoping this would spark an uprising. He is now under 
arrest and at least eight to 10 other people—including the 
commanders of an elite marine unit and  a special police squad—
are reportedly being sought for questioning.29   
On November 02, 2006, Philippine military chief Hermogenes 
Esperon said that he has identified two officers as those who asked senior 
military leaders to withdraw support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in 
February. Identified were “former Marine commandant Renato Miranda and 
former Philippine National Police Special Forces Chief Marcelino Franco [as 
those who] asked the military top leaders to support their coup plan on Feb. 24, 
Esperson said.”30 Miranda was relieved from his position before the coup attempt 




                                             
27 Michael J. Montesano, “The Philippines in 2003: Troubles, None of Them New,” Asian 
Survey. 44:1 (January/February 2004): 94. 
28 BBC, “Emergency Declared in Philippines,” BBC, February 24, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4745716.stm (accessed November 2, 2006). 
29 Ibid. 
30 People’s Daily, “Philippine Military Chief Identifies two Officers as Coup Planners,” 
People’s Daily, November 2, 2006, http://english.people.com.cn/200611/02/eng20061102 
_317705.html (accessed November 2, 2006). 
31 Ibid. 
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2. Summary of Findings 
All of the above mentioned factors either contribute to or indicate the 
Philippine state suffers from weakness and points to this as the primary factor 
contributing to the persistence of the communist insurgency. For example, as 
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel explained, the existing political parties in the 
Philippines remain weak with  
many of them…founded by politicos several generations ago. They 
no longer address the needs of the times…, do not have solid 
ideological moorings, and their members are blissfully unaware of 
what their parties really stand for. Many party members just follow 
the stance of their leader who may shift directions as the wind 
blows. Most political parties depend on the personal fortunes their 
individual leaders possess to fund their political work.32 
The net effect is that instead of appealing to their constituency on the basis of 
their political platforms, the parties do so on the basis of their leader’s ability to 
disburse funds to meet partisan or personal needs.33 The result is often party 
switching as an elected official will jump ship and join whichever party he or she 
feels will get them the most money. With constituents left feeling a sense of 
political abandonment, the CPP-NPA swoop in and offer an alternative to the 
disaffected population. 
Social inequality has contributed to the insurgency because the CPP-NPA 
have been able to make life a little easier for villagers in areas under their control. 
Even after the fall of the Marcos regime, communist insurgents were still able to 
do wonders in their territories by appealing to those Filipinos who were no longer 
enchanted by prospects of reform that either never came or were slow to reach 
the rural areas. Although CPP-NPA numbers were reduced significantly following 
the ouster of Marcos and the lifting of martial law (Table 1), the CPP was able to 
win the hearts and minds of the peasant working class who grew increasingly 
disenchanted with the lack of effort to increase equality among Philippine 
citizens. As was indicated earlier, as of 2003, nearly half of the country’s 
                                            
32 Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Multi-parties Strengthen Democracy. 
33 Ibid. 
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farmland remained owned by a small handful of families who were descendents 
of Spanish colonizers, half of the working class were landless laborers, and land 
reform had largely floundered. Additionally, political levers continue to be held by 
the landowning Philippine elite who have consistently dragged their feet on 
agrarian reform with the wealthy landowners often preferring instead to let their 
land go to seed rather than see it turned over to their tenants.   By the end of 
2005, there had been talk of reform but little real progress had taken place in the 
face of the country’s entrenched problems of poverty, social inequality, and 
indebtedness.  
Finally, although the government believes that the NPA’s armed strength 
has decreased slightly from the 1990s to 2000s, the number of communist 
influenced barangays (villages) throughout the country has actually grown during 
the same period (Table 1). The presence of the NPA throughout many of the 
provinces underscores the fact that the Philippine military is hampered by poorly 
trained and equipped troops with low morale. For instance, the lack of modern, 
functional equipment and poor coordination between intelligence and operational 
units are key factors for why the AFP has been largely unable to defeat the 
NPA.34 Military limitation as a symptom of weakness has created a permissive 
environment for the CPP-NPA to operate in.  
                                            
34 See Michael J. Montesano, “The Philippines in 2002: Playing Politics, Facing Deficits, and 
Embracing Uncle Sam,” Asian Survey, 43:1 (January/February 2003): 156-166 and Michael J. 
Montesano, “The Philippines in 2003: Troubles, None of Them New,” Asian Survey, 44:1 
(January/February 2004): 99-103. 
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Table 1.   CPP-NPA Statistics 1968-200435 
                                            
35 Carolina G. Hernandez, “Institutional Responses to Armed Conflict: The Armed Forces of 
the Philippines” (paper submitted to the Human Development Network Foundation for the 
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II. THE INSURGENCY 
The revolution began in the fertile mind of a college English 
literature teacher fond of poetry and philosophy, but ultimately 
drawn to the writings of Karl Marx, V.I. Lenin, and Mao Zedong. 
Indeed the latter’s works provided José Maria Sison with the 
framework for an armed revolution, a ‘protracted people’s war’ in 
which, he envisioned, historically oppressed Philippine peasants 
would form the nucleus of a communist army. From the 
countryside, the rebel army would gradually ‘encircle the cities’ and 
advance ‘wave upon wave’ as he put it at the vanguard of a social 
and political revolution that would sweep to power. The Philippine 
revolution was a product of the classical Third World fusion of 
peasant unrest and nationalism. 
     - Gregg R. Jones36  
Before delving into the reasons surrounding the persistence of the 
Philippine communist insurgency, it is important to first understand the nature of 
the insurgency. Communist guerillas have been waging a Maoist insurgency in 
the Philippines for more than 38 years and pose a greater security threat to the 
Philippines than Abu Sayyaf or the Muslim secessionist movements of the Moro 
National Liberation Front and the more radical splinter organization the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front. The CPP and its armed guerilla wing, the NPA, are 
considered to be the main security threat to the peace and security of the 
Philippines because of its nationwide presence and advanced capability to mount 
an armed rebellion.  
Aside from pursuing an armed struggle against the government, the CPP 
has been able to maximize their so called “legal struggle” by using its umbrella 
front, the National Democratic Front (NDF) to organize and agitate the populace. 
Such front organizations aid the accomplishment of CPP goals by working 
closely with the government while at the same time maintaining clandestine ties 
with the communist rebels.  
                                            
36 Gregg R. Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerilla Movement (Boulder, San 
Francisco, London: Westview Press, 1989): 5. 
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Following the Chinese and Vietnamese models, the CPP-NPA-NDF act 
together to wage a protracted struggle with the goal of seizing political power. To 
accomplish this goal, the CPP-NPA seek to encircle the cities from the 
countryside with armed guerillas. The CPP-NPA-NDF complex will then augment 
armed struggle, while establishing “mass base”37 areas in the countryside, with 
the organization of mass movements in urban centers to support and sustain the 
organization. 
Despite some setbacks in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the CPP-NDF 
conglomerate continues to conduct political, economic social and psychological 
activities to this date to drive a wedge between the people and the government. 
Communist guerillas have been able to infiltrate many legitimate organizations, 
such as those in labor and student youth groups on college campuses. The CPP 
is responsible for politicizing, agitating, and organizing the aforementioned 
sectors to participate in CPP-initiated rallies, demonstrations, strikes, and other 
forms of protest actions against the government. While the CPP-NDF work 
together in the Philippines’ urban areas, NPA elements are responsible for 
confronting the Armed Forces of the Philippines and for protecting guerilla 
members, their movements, and supporters.  
Although the communist movement split in the mid-1990s into two main 
groups—1) the “reaffirmist” mainstream CPP-NPA-NDF and 2) the new 
“rejectionist” faction—both factions share a common strategic objective, namely: 
seizing political power and establishing a communist-ruled government. In recent 
years, the communist movement has seen a resurgence in terms of the number 
of guerilla fighters, firearms, mass bases, and guerilla fronts.38 For example 
barangays affected by communist influence rose from 2,490 in 2003 to 2,510 in 
                                            
37 Guerilla mass base areas are areas in the countryside consisting of several barangays or 
villages, covering two or more towns or provinces, where guerilla units have established their 
control and influence through their own mass organizations and local organs of political power. 
38 A guerilla front is a politico-military-geographical unit of the CPP-NPA-NDF which consists 
of a political organization usually made up of a front committee; a military organization made up 
of a regular mobile force or forces varying in size, armed propaganda teams, and local militias; an 
area of responsibility consisting of one to several municipalities. Most of these guerilla fronts are 
located along provincial boundaries with mountainous/forested terrain, but there are some which 
are located in the plains, along coastlines, and in depressed areas in urban centers. 
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2004 and the number of guerilla fronts steadily increased from a low of 41 in 
1992 to 106 in 2004 (Figure 1). In response to the growing number of insurgents, 
the AFP has made it a goal to dismantle more than 120 guerilla fronts nationwide 
in the next several years.39 In 2002 alone, the AFP had to clear 400 communist 
affected barangays, suggesting that the CPP-NPA has grown considerably in 
recent years. 
The NPA is capable of conducting terrorist actions which are both 
selective and discriminate, such as murder, assassination, bombings, 
kidnapping, intimidation and coercion of elected officials, arson, and extortion. All 
activities are conducted in order to gain control over people and their areas of 
operation. The NPA is also able to conduct many other activities including 
harassment, raids, and ambushes against government forces and military 
targets. Guerilla operations such as these are inevitably aimed at weakening the 
government’s security forces in order to eventually destroy them and with them, 
the political will of the people. 
Because of the inclusion of the CPP-NPA on the current United States 
terrorist watchlist, external financial support has been dwindling. Thus, the 
insurgents have stepped-up their campaign of extortion in the form of their 
“revolutionary tax” levied from business establishments in the cities and 
countryside to generate much needed funds. During the last national elections, 
for instance, guerillas demanded exorbitant amounts of money from candidates 
in exchange for being allowed to campaign in rebel controlled areas. Additionally, 
in order to sustain and bolster their declining ranks, the communist guerillas have 
resorted to the recruiting of minors. 
Despite the fact that the CPP has been added to the U.S. terrorist 
watchlist, the Philippine government has pursued peace talks with the CPP in the 
past. However, talks with CPP representatives have stalled in part because the                                             
39 “Annual Assessment on AFP Internal Security Operations” (briefing presented at the AFP 
Command Conference for CY 2005, January 15, 2005). http://www.afp.mil.ph/pio-
crs/search2.php?entry_id=376 (accessed March 10, 2007). See also “Reds Belittle AFP Vow to 
Crush Guerilla Fronts,” GMA News.tv, January 8, 2007, 
http://www.gmanews.tv/story/26098/Reds-belittle-AFP-vow-to-crush-guerilla-fronts (accessed 
March 10, 2007). 
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CPP, on its latest bid to acquire greater strength, demanded that they be taken 
off the list before pursuing peace talks. The Philippine military, however, has 
found fresh evidence of growing links between the CPP and foreign terrorist 
organizations that the CPP has vehemently denied. Thus, in June 2006, 
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered a reassessment of the government’s 
strategy in addressing the more than three decade old insurgency.40 The military 
strategy for defeating the insurgency is outlined in Internal Security Operations 
(ISO) Operations Plan (OPLAN) Bantay Laya. OPLAN Bantay Laya serves as 
President Arroyo’s master plan for delivering the final blow to a 38 year 
insurgency that no president from Ferdinand Marcos to Corazon Aquino, from 
Fidel Ramos to Joseph Estrada was able to tame. It is the fourth such counter-
insurgency master plan adopted by the government in 25 years.41 
                                            
40 Fe B. Zamora, “Arroyo war ‘end-game’ vs NPA OPLAN Bantay Laya to deliver final blow,” 
INQ7.net, June 18, 2006, http://news.inquirer.net/nation/index.php?index=1andstory_id=79481 
(accessed March 10, 2007).  
41 Ibid. 
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III. A STATE IN CRISIS: WEAKNESS OF THE PHILIPPINE 
STATE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
If we were to draw an analogy of the Philippines, it would be that of a petri 
dish of sorts, whereby the CPP-NPA benefit from a perfect environment 
characterized by state weakness. State weakness has allowed enemies of the 
state to exploit contested elections. Military coups have damaged public 
perception of the government and tarnished the image of the military as an 
extension of said government. Corruption within both public and private sectors 
has bled the government’s coffers to the tune of millions in lost revenue each 
year. A lack of agrarian reforms and jobs has pushed the poor and unemployed 
towards the rank and file of the CPP-NPA where they receive food, money, and 
shelter. Additionally, the AFP lacks the necessary equipment (i.e., airlift, 
helicopters, UAVs, etc.) to mount an effective counterinsurgency operation. 
Combined with low morale, bad equipment, and poor intelligence collection and 
dissemination, these create the perfect environment for a Maoist-like insurgency 
to fester. This section will expand on the thoughts presented above and highlight 
specific examples of Philippine state weakness.  
B. POLITICAL CRISES 
Several political crises have been in the Philippine headlines which 
ultimately call into question the administration’s ability to effectively govern its 
people. For example, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has been in political 
hot water for several years after being caught on tape discussing her reelection 
with an election official.42 In mid-2005, taped conversations between President 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and Commission on Elections (COMELEC) 
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano surfaced and came to be called the “Hello 
Garci” scandal. Analysis of the taped phone conversations alleged that GMA and 
Garcillano conspired together to ensure that GMA would win reelection by more 
                                            
42 Dana R. Dillon, “Crisis in the Philippines: What does it mean for the U.S.?,” The Heritage 
Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm799.cfm (accessed February 
16, 2007). 
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than 1 million votes. This election scandal has repeatedly resurfaced with at least 
three impeachment complaints against the President being referred to the House 
Committee on Justice.43 
Additionally, the Philippines is no stranger to coups d’état. For instance, 
since the foiled coup that set the stage for the people-power uprising in 1986 and 
led to the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos from the presidency, a coup in January 
2001, unsettling coup rumors in October 2001, and coup attempts in July 2003 
and February 2006 have been part of what might be called the Philippine version 
of democracy.44 To put it in perspective, 
two of the past five presidents have been ousted by what amounted 
to civilian-backed military coups. Two others owe their presidencies 
to the same coups. The only one who entered and departed without 
military intervention was himself a general. Along the way, there 
have been innumerable feints and jabs by groups of junior officers 
whose youth and sense of mission sometimes made them 
vulnerable to manipulation by civilians with political agendas.45 
The Arroyo government claimed that it foiled the coup d’état attempt 
against the administration on February 24, 2006 and by virtue of Proclamation 
No. 1017, the Philippines was placed under a state of emergency that morning. 
Proclamation No. 1017 signed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claimed 
that  
elements in the political opposition have conspired with 
authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-
NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists—





                                            
43 “House Resolution 895,” Republic of the Philippines, House of Representatives, Thirteenth 
Congress Second Regular Session, http://www.pcij.org/blog/wp-docs/HR895NoChaCha.pdf 
(accessed February 16, 2007). 
44 Seth Mydans, “For Philippine Military, Politics Remains a Crucial Mission,” New York 
Times, March 5, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/05/international/asia/ 
05filip.html?ei=5088anden=d389d7a3d3586b96andex=1299214800andadxnnl=6andpartner=rssn
ytandemc=rssandadxnnlx=1159542258-dL94sz36cB0jfy9UO6nWqQ (accessed March 16, 2007). 
45 Ibid. 
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now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and 
systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-
constituted Government elected in May 2004.46 
The February 2006 coup attempt follows the 2003 Oakwood mutiny whereby 
President Arroyo, members of her cabinet, and the military were charged with 
corruption by a group of junior officers and enlisted men. 
1. Weak Political Parties and Contested Outcomes 
The Philippine political environment today operates in an arena in which 
the media are free and vocal. There is an active civil society consisting of over 
14,000 voluntary secular organizations and hundreds of institutes and lay 
associations affiliated with the Catholic and other churches which is able to 
provide and outlet for a variety of views outside the traditional political 
spectrum.47 Political structures and institutions such as the Office of the 
President, Senate, and House of Representatives remain viable and command 
respect, even when the individuals running them do not. “Despite all this, 
Philippine democracy exists in an atmosphere of institutionalized crisis. For 
example, in the last four decades, only one president (Fidel Ramos, 1992-1998) 
has entered and left office through a regular democratic process.”48 Additionally,  
National and local posts remain dominated by an unrepresentative 
elite that is more adept at advancing personal interests than at 
crafting coherent policies. The bloated bureaucracy has proven 
highly resistant to reform. The economy has posted credible growth 
figures, but the benefits of growth remain focused in urban areas, 
exacerbating the economic gap between the cities and the 
countryside. Economically depressed “zones of desperation” have 
evolved in several regions, creating havens for insurgency and 
sending an unmanageable wave of migrants to swell the ranks of 
the urban poor.49  
                                            
46 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, “Proclamation No. 1017,” Malacanang Palace, Manila, 
http://www.news.ops.gov.ph/proc_no1017.htm (accessed February 16, 2007). 
47 Gabriella R. Montinola, “Parties and Accountability in the Philippines,” Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 10 No. 1 (January 1999): 129. 
48 Ibid., 114. 
49 Ibid. 
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“The case of a vice-president running for reelection after finishing the term 
of a president who left office early was unforeseen, and the powers of public 
office gave Macapagal-Arroyo’s coalition a crucial edge…The party system, 
already dysfunctional, in effect ceased to exist.”50 As Steven Rogers explains, 
the weakest link in the Philippine democratic process has long been the counting 
of votes, which can go on for weeks after the election has taken place.51  The 
Presidential election of 2004 was no different. When the official results were 
released six weeks after the election, GMA had won 40 percent of the vote, with 
her leading opponent (Fernando Poe, Jr.) trailing with 36.5 percent. “The chaotic 
conduct of the election left allegations of fraud easy to believe and difficult to 
deny. Many poor voters came away convinced that their selected spokesman 
had one again been maneuvered out of power by an elite-dominated system that 
remains beyond their influence.”52 
The ongoing election scandal and repeated calls for impeachment have 
resulted in both low popularity and trust ratings for GMA as revealed by the latest 
Pulse Asia survey of November 2006. Pulse Asia’s November 2006 Ulat ng 
Bayan Survey reveals a 48% national disapproval rating for the President (Table 
2). “Despite her administration’s oft-cited improvements in national economic 
performance and fiscal management in the two quarters preceding the survey, 
President Arroyo’s overall performance ratings are not significantly different from 
those recorded in July 2006 (44% national disapproval rating).”53 With respect to 
presidential trust ratings, one out of every two Filipinos (50%) distrusts President 
Arroyo while 21% of those surveyed express trust in her and 28% are unable to 
say whether they trust or distrust her (Table 3).54 
                                            
50 Steven Rogers, “Philippine Politics and the Rule of Law,” Journal of Democracy, Vol 15 
No. 4 (October 2004): 112. 
51 Ibid., 113. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Pulse Asia, “Media Release on Performance Ratings of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, Other Top National Government Officials, and the National Administration,” Pulse Asia 
Inc., 
http://pulseasia.newsmaker.ph/main.asp?mode=andpage=articleandarticleID=611211093670 




Table 2.   Comparative Performance Ratings of President Gloria Arroyo55 
 
 
Table 3.   Comparative Trust Ratings of President Gloria Arroyo56 
 
Party switching is commonplace in the Philippines and the platforms and 
policies the people vote for often go unrealized. “In the Philippines, politicians 
who switch parties are rewarded with nominations, access to resources, and 
prime committee posts by the new party.  Furthermore, because politics in the 
Philippines is personality driven, voters often continue to support politicians even 
if they switch parties.”57 For example, five Philippine presidents have switched 
parties when they either failed or believed they would fail to receive the official 
party nomination for the presidential election. 
                                            
55 Pulse Asia, Media Release on Performance Ratings of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, Other Top National Government Officials, and the National Administration. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats, “Concept Paper,” Council of Asian Liberals and 
Democrats, http://www.cald.org/missionsandvisits/ndi/philippines/caldndi_mission_phil_ 
concept.htm#_ftn1 (accessed February 18, 2007). 
26 
• Manuel Roxas (1946-1948) switched from the Nacionalista Party to 
the Liberal Party  
• Ramon Magsaysay (1953-1957) switched from the Liberal Party to 
the Nacionalista Party 
• Ferdinand Marcos (1965-1986) switched from the Liberal Party to 
the Nacionalista Party and later to Kilusang Bagong Lipunan  
• Fidel Ramos (1992-1998) switched from LDP to Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP) 
• Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-present) switched from LDP to 
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP-KAMPI). 
Party switching is prevalent among legislators as well, in part due to the 
broad powers of the Office of the President.  The president’s extensive control 
over discretionary funds encourages legislators to switch to the party of the 
president.  These legislators, then, have greater access to state funds and can 
provide rewards and other perks to their constituents.  For example, during the 
1992 Philippine elections, the majority party under the Corazon Aquino 
administration—Democratic Filipino Struggle (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino 
or LDP)—won 43 percent of the House, while the party of incoming president 
Fidel Ramos—Strength-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD)—
won only 18 percent.58 This presented the LDP representatives with the 
opportunity to play the role of a strong opposition party within a divided 
government; however, 62 percent of LDP House members switched parties to 
join Lakas-NUCD.59  
The events following the May 1998 elections looked remarkably similar to 
those that followed the 1992 elections. Joseph Estrada's party—the Struggle of 
the Nationalist Filipino Masses (Laban ng Masang Makabayang Pilipino or 
LAMMP)—won 32 percent of the House seats, but was overshadowed by Fidel 
Ramos's Lakas, which won 54 percent of the House seats. True to form, 57 
percent of Lakas representatives switched to LAMMP after the election in order 
to place themselves within the incoming president's graces. This had the effect of 
                                            
58 Gabriella R. Montinola, Parties and Accountability in the Philippines, 137. 
59 Ibid. 
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virtually decimating the victorious Lakas party and eliminated the possibility of 
any sort of meaningful congressional opposition to the new administration.60 
Party switching results from and ultimately contributes to the lack of strong 
ideological party affiliations.  Because political parties lack firm ideological bases 
and clear party platforms, politicians do not develop strong ties to parties and will 
change their party affiliation in order to advance their own self-interests.  In turn, 
parties are unable to develop a clear mandate and platform because their 
membership is frequently changing party affiliations. Gloria Montinola suggests 
that “without comprehensive changes in the political party system, the quality of 
Philippine democracy and its capacity to generate policy changes benefiting the 
majority of citizens will continue to be compromised by a colossal deficit of 
accountability. Narrowing the gulf between the rulers and the ruled in the 
Philippines requires altering political institutions that have hindered the 
emergence of a strong party system.”61 
In an e-mail message to the author on June 19, 2006, Patricio Abinales 
highlighted that one of the things not always talked about is the fact that the 
politicians themselves seek out, bargain, and make mutual accommodation with 
the CPP in order that election results would go their way.62 For example, 
President Arroyo's party,  
did not hesitate to "reach out" to the CPP in 2000 and in 2004 to 
form de facto electoral coalitions that would ensure both their 
parties win the ballot. At the provincial and local levels, something 
similar has happened, too. This is especially important for a local 
political aspirant because the NPA can "deliver" the rural votes that 
he or she needs. The politician, in turn, can order his patronage 
networks to vote for Bayan Muna, or will promise the CPP access 
to some of the pork barrel funds that he will eventually get his 
hands on, once elected.63  
                                            
60 Gabriella R. Montinola, Parties and Accountability in the Philippines, 137. 
61 Ibid., 138. 
62 Patricio Abinales, e-mail to the author on June 19, 2006. 
63 Ibid. 
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One reason why such arrangements are possible is that the staff of politicians 
like Arroyo includes many ex-CPP cadres or NDF activists who, while already out 
of "the movement," continue to maintain ties with their former comrades. And like 
any other close organization, friendships can often outlast or set aside political 
differences. Hence during electoral campaigns all one needs is to call the other 
via mobile phone, set up a meeting, and start the bargaining.64 
The weak party system has often been blamed for Philippine democracy’s 
inability to produce sound governance and meaningful social change because 
“political parties have failed to structure political competition to allow for the 
representation of the interests of the poor and marginalized sectors.”65 Parties 
structure political competition through their platforms, policies, and prior 
government involvement. However, political parties in the Philippines are often 
characterized by the absence of strong ideological agendas and frequent party 
switching. This has ultimately contributed to the persistence of the communist 
insurgency because as politicians switch from one political party to the next, they 
do so without addressing the underlying causes of rural discontent. For example, 
as campaign promises go unfunded and unfulfilled, many more of the Philippines’ 
poor and disaffected will turn their backs on the government and will instead turn 
to the CPP-NPA for guidance and assistance. 
2. Coup Attempts, Mutiny, and a Declared State of Emergency 
Our country needs these coup rumors like we need a hole in the 
head. 
   - Presidential Spokesman Rigoberto Tiglao66 
Talks of overthrowing the government, coup attempts, and military 
mutinies have been a persistent problem for nearly all of the Philippine 
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_rocamora_parties (accessed March 17, 2007). 
66 CNN, “Philippine Market Slides on Coup Rumors,” CNN.com, October 24, 2001, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/10/24/phil.markets/ (accessed March 2, 
2007). 
29 
administrations with the administration of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo having been 
particularly hard hit with accusations of governmental misconduct. The coups 
real or imagined serve to fuel the fires of rebellion in both the civilian population 
and the military ranks. This section will highlight some of the most recent 
attempts against the Philippine government and the impact they have had on the 
government and the people and the effect they have had on the insurgency. 
a. October 2001—Rumors of a Coup 
Within the first year of her tenure as President, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo was faced with quelling rumors of a coup attempt against her presidency. 
Although the government was quick to address the rumors by blaming the 
opposition for spreading lies that only served to damage Philippine interests, 
speculation of governmental vulnerability to a coup sent the country's already 
deteriorating stock market into a 10 year low (Figure 2).  
In a statement issued to the public, Presidential spokesman 
Roberto Tiglao denied the existence of a coup plot (dubbed Black October), 
saying that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo “still holds the support of the 
people and the military. In this day and age, and especially against an 
administration that has the support of the people and all institutions including the 
military, no coup plot could ever get beyond the talking stage."67 This statement 
would come back to haunt the administration two years later as the following 
section will highlight.  
The Black October coup may not have been real; however, damage 
to investor confidence by the end of the week had already been done. Having 
made it through the People Power coup that ousted President Estrada in January 
fairly unscathed, investors were not willing to risk sitting through another coup 
and losing everything. This prompted a mass stock sell off which the Arroyo 
administration would have to spend great amounts of time and energy to reverse 
in light of negative public sentiment and declining investor confidence.  
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Figure 2.   Philippine Stock Exchange Index (PSI) Summary for 1997-200768  
                                            
68 “Philippine Stock Exchange Index Summary,” Yahoo Finance, 
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b. July 2003—The Oakwood Mutiny 
There is absolutely no justification for the actions you have 
taken…You have already defamed the uniform. Do not drench it 
with dishonor. 
    - President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo69 
On July 27, 2003, approximately 300 Philippine officer and enlisted 
soldiers and sailors took control of a shopping center and apartment complex in 
the Manila suburb of Makati. Because of the location (Oakwood Premier Ayala 
Center) the event would come to be known as the Oakwood Mutiny. A 
spokesmen for the military mutineers told reporters that his group was “not 
attempting to grab power, but was just trying to express [its] grievances.”70 Those 
grievances included allegations that the Arroyo government and the armed 
forces were selling arms and supplies to rebel groups; that President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo, her defense secretary, and the intelligence chief had planned 
and orchestrated several bombings in the city of Davao in March and April 2003 
in order to receive more aid from the United States to fight terrorism. There were 
also allegations that President Arroyo was planning to declare martial law so that 
she could stay in power after the end of her term in 2004.71  
The mutineers surrendered after Arroyo gave them a five-hour 
ultimatum and the entire crisis lasted just 20 hours. 
For supposedly intelligent young officers who are said to be the 
"best and the brightest" of Philippine Military Academy (PMA) class 
of 1995, their claim that the President intends to prolong her term 
by declaring martial law reflects faulty reading of the political 
climate in the country. By such claim, the rebels showed political 
immaturity and amateurish judgments. It showed them as no better  
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than the opposition. They grossly misread the President's political 
style. They must have been thinking of Ferdinand Marcos' reasons 
for declaring martial law.72 
The mutiny failed to bring about the type of sweeping changes that were ushered 
in by EDSA-1 and EDSA-273 yet it managed to once again highlight the urgency 
of undertaking reforms within both the military establishment and the 
government.  
c. February 2006—A State of Emergency 
Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declared a state of 
emergency on February 24, 2006 following the discovery and public 
announcement of an alleged coup attempt against her administration. 
Presidential spokesman Ignacio Bunye released information that Arroyo had 
signed Proclamation No. 1017 Declaring a State of National Emergency. In the 
declaration, President Arroyo invoked Section 18, Article 7 of the Constitution 
that allows the President to call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress 
rebellion.74  
President Arroyo claimed that several months prior to the February 
declaration of a state of emergency,  
elements in the political opposition had conspired with 
authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-
NPA (National Democratic Front-Communist Party of the 
Philippines-New People's Army) and the extreme Right, 
represented by military adventurists—the historic enemies of the 
democratic Philippine State—who are now in a tactical alliance and 
engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad 
front, to bring down the duly constituted government elected in May 
2004.75  
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Arroyo said this series of actions were “hurting the Philippine State by obstructing 
governance including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the 
people’s confidence in government and their faith in the future of this 
country…These activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and 
extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the 
democratic Philippine State.”76 
Two days after Proclamation No. 1017 Declaring a State of 
National Emergency was released, Malacañang (the official residence of 
President Arroyo) released a "Chronology of Conspiracy" that highlighted efforts 
of the communist underground, certain military officers, and some members of 
the political opposition to overthrow the government which prompted President 
Arroyo to issue Proclamation No. 1017. The three-page document cited the 
series of events leading up to the issuance of Proclamation No. 1017. 
• On 17 January, four officers among the Magdalo group on trial for 
the 2003 Oakwood mutiny, escaped military custody. 
• New People’s Army spokesman Ka Roger Rosal offered sanctuary 
to the four escaped Magdalo rebel soldiers. 
• A captured document titled "Oplan Hackle" detailed plans for 
bombings and attacks starting on the Philippine Military Academy 
alumni homecoming on 18 February. The document also included a 
plan to free more Magdalo soldiers being held in custody. 
• Pro-Estrada supporters hold daily vigils and masses at the People 
Power Monument since 12 February. 
• CPP-linked groups mounted rallies from 17 to 22 February. In 
weeks prior, the New People’s Army intensified attacks on 
government troops. 
• On 20 February anti-Arroyo groups announced plans to march 
20,000 protesters on 22 February around Metro Manila, converge 
at the People Power Monument on 23 February, and possibly move 
to Mendiola on 24 February. 
• On 21 February, one of the escaped soldiers, Lt. Lawrence San 
Juan, was arrested while plotting with two NPA figures in a 
communist safehouse in Batangas province.  
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• The CPP directed front organizations to stage mass protests on 24 
February, with 5,000 participants from Metro Manila and 25,000 
from nearby provinces. 
• On 23 February, residents near the Philippine National Police 
Special Action Force (SAF) base were told to take precautions 
because some SAF elements were planning to defect. 
• Late afternoon of 23 February, Brigadier General Danilo Lim and 
Marine brigade commander Colonel Ariel Querubin told AFP Chief 
of Staff General Generoso Senga that restive young officers and 
soldiers planned to join rallies on 24 February, so as to provide 
critical mass and the armed component to the protests.77 
Peter Wallace, a business consultant who has lived in the 
Philippines for more than 30 years, noted that the problem facing President 
Arroyo is that she will be spending all her time putting out political fires and 
looking over her back and not concentrating on the real job of putting the country 
right.78 Randy David, a columnist with the Philippine Daily Inquirer who was 
arrested during the state of emergency, wrote that there were striking parallels 
between Arroyo's announcement and Marcos' proclamation to announce a 
nationwide state of emergency in February 1986. He said, "How uncanny that 
Ms. Arroyo should choose the same date to announce the same draconian 
measures to suppress the same perceived conspiracy supposedly between the 
extreme left and extreme right."79 
Regardless of whether there was actually a concerted effort by 
authoritarians of the extreme Left (represented by the CPP-NPA-NDF) and the 
extreme Right (represented by military adventurists) to overthrow the Arroyo 
government, the damage to her public image has been done. Although the state 
of emergency was lifted several days later, the days of Marcos-imposed martial 
law are still fresh in Filipino minds. As long as there are individuals with access to  
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media outlets who can draw parallels between the Arroyo government’s actions 
and the Marcos regime, President Arroyo will have to work twice as hard to 
ensure her actions are viewed as nothing less than honorable.  
3. Conclusion 
The 2001 Black October coup, the 2003 Oakwood mutiny, and the 2006 
state of emergency have done more than just tarnish President Arroyo’s public 
image; they have also hurt the country’s credibility on the international market 
and likely deterred some much needed foreign investment. For example, 
according to analysts at neoIT (a consulting firm that is focused on helping 
leading firms improve operations and grow their business by capitalizing on 
globalization), the political uncertainty surrounding the Philippines has sent 
negative signals to the international community of foreign investors.80 Those who 
do choose to invest in the Philippines do so amid “continued restrictions on land 
ownership and lingering concerns about the business environment, including an 
inefficient legal system, aging infrastructure, widespread corruption, and political 
and security risks.”81 
Increased foreign investment in the Philippines could bolster economic 
growth, create jobs, and increase exports, all of which could improve the 
economy and boost popular support for the government. These factors would, in 
turn, have a positive effect on countering the communist insurgency. For 
example, as jobs are created and development projects undertaken, a segment 
of the population previously willing to turn to the CPP-NPA for help, will instead 
turn to the government. Additionally, increased public confidence would 
effectively serve to undercut the influence the CPP-NPA have over the portion of 
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on them. Unfortunately, those who were considering making investments in the 
Philippines may likely be thinking twice abut doing so in light of political and 
economic volatility.82  
Political instability has contributed to repeated budget deficits which have 
led to a sharp rise in public debt—which still exceeds 60% of Gross Domestic 
Product.83 Additionally, the cash-strapped government spends around one third 
of its revenue making interest payments on its outstanding borrowings, 
unemployment remains as high as 8%, and the forecasted jobless rate remains 
high as long as economic growth falls short of the level needed to create jobs for 
a fast-expanding labor force.84 The state’s inability to draw on capital from 
foreign investment for economic reform, job creation, and an overall lack of public 
confidence in the administration have all combined to hinder the government’s 
campaign against the communist insurgents.  
C. CORRUPTION 
Bureaucratic corruption with its numerous leakages is bad. So is 
government incompetence. Unlike in the private sector, where the 
free market punishes mistakes, government incompetence 
punishes only the public. We have to tear away layers of 
inefficiency piled on by decades of political accommodation: 
redundancy in the national service, waste in local governments, 
and pointless procedures for getting done what isn’t needed 
anyway to secure the public welfare. Just how does paying off the 
health inspector banish bacteria from a dirty kitchen?  
    - President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo85 
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1. Corruption Defined 
Terrorists and organized criminal groups such as the CPP-NPA have been 
able to exploit systemic weaknesses in the Philippines through corrupt practices.  
As one observer noted, “they have duped and suborned individuals in 
government into virtually selling their sovereignty so as to create ‘states of 
convenience’ for themselves.”86  
Just as there are many definitions for terrorism, corruption has many 
different definitions as well. Corruption is often defined as the misuse of public 
power for private gain. The World Bank defines corruption as “the abuse of public 
office for private gain.”87 One problem with this definition is that it is rather vague. 
Questions can be drawn as to the extent of the terms “public office” and “private 
gains.” The definition hints that corruption is limited to government officials and 
does not include private firms or individuals with extensive ties to government 
activities.  
A longer definition of corruption provided by the Asian Development Bank 
states that corruption  
involves behavior on the part of officials in the public and private 
sectors, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves 
and/or those close to them, or induce others to do so, by misusing 
the position in which they are placed.88 
Joseph Nye provides a more specific definition. He defines corruption as  
…behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role 
because of private-regarding (family, close family, private clique) 
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of 
certain types of private-regarding influence.  This includes such 
behavior as bribery; use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a 
person in a position of trust; nepotism (bestowal of patronage by 
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reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and 
misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for 
private-regarding uses).89 This definition is widely accepted by the 
anti-corruption community.  
In conjunction with the Center for International Crime Prevention, the 
United Nations has prepared the Manual on Anti-Corruption Policy, in 
accordance with Economic and Social Council Resolutions 1995/14, 1996/8 and 
1998/16, and General Assembly Resolutions 51/59 and 54/128. The document 
defines corruption as an  
…abuse of public power for private gain that hampers the public 
interest. This gain may be direct or indirect. Most of the time, 
corruption entails a confusion of the private with the public sphere 
or an illicit exchange between the two spheres. In essence, corrupt 
practices involve public officials acting in the best interest of private 
concerns (their own or those of others) regardless of, or against, 
the public interest. The bottom line is that corruption entails public 
officials using their power to benefit themselves or those around 
them in some way.90  
Whichever definition we choose to use, corruption encompasses a wide 
range of phenomena, from a police officer who accepts money from drug dealers 
to turn a blind eye to their activity, to a customs agent who extorts from legitimate 
businesses, to the politician who receives a bribe to vote one way or another. As 
different as these phenomena are, they may be driven by the same causes and 
have similar detrimental effects upon economic and social outcomes. 
2. Prevalence of Corruption 
In his article, De-institutionalizing Corruption in the Philippines, Eric 
Batalla, claims 
When corrupt behaviors are perennially extensive or pervasive in 
society, it can be said that corruption has been institutionalized. It 
has become a way of life, a goal, and an outlook towards the public 
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office. Institutionalized corruption is a problem that thrives in the 
weakness of both public and private institutions to act as effective 
fiscalisers [sic] for the greater public good.91  
Corruption is prevalent in the Philippines and has indeed reached 
institutionalized levels. Such a reality is reflected by a general perception as 
documented by Social Weather Stations (SWS)92 and Transparency 
International.93 In partnership with the Makati Business Club, SWS has 
undertaken a series of Surveys of Enterprises on Corruption since 2000 within 
the auspices of the Transparent Accountable Governance project. The surveys 
were funded by The Asia Foundation from resources provided by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID). Of particular interest are 
the data obtained by SWS regarding both public and private sector corruption 
within Metro Manila, Metro Cebu and Metro Davao, Cavite-Laguna-Batangas, 
and Cagayan de Oro-Iligan.  
a. Public Sector Corruption 
Data obtained by SWS revealed that 66% of managers reported 
seeing “a lot” of corruption in the public sector in the 2005 survey, showing 
essentially no trend (either steady increase or decrease) over the past five years. 
However, this represented an overall decrease from a high of 77% in 2001 after 
the downfall of the Estrada administration (Table 4).  
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Table 4.   Philippine Perception of Public Sector Corruption94 
 
Fifty-four percent of managers surveyed said that most or almost all 
companies in their line of business practice bribery to win public sector contracts, 
the median estimated allotment for bribery being 15%.95 Significant numbers of 
managers also indicated that their companies were asked for bribes in relation to 
getting local government and national government permits and licenses, paying 
income taxes, complying with import regulations, collecting receivables from the 
government, supplying the government with goods or services, and availing of 
government incentives (Table 5).96 But only 8% of those who were solicited 
reported it to any public or private anti-corruption group. 
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Table 5.   Solicitation of Bribes97 
 
b. Private Sector Corruption 
The 2005 SWS Survey of Enterprise on Corruption indicated that 
corruption also exists within the private sector, with 10% of managers seeing “a 
lot” of it (Table 6). Twenty-seven percent say that most or almost all companies 
in their own line of business give bribes to win private sector contracts, the 
median estimated allotment for bribery being 10%. House-cleaning is also 
required in the private sector, with only 48% of the managers saying that all 
companies in their sector always demand receipts, only 32% saying that all 
companies always issue receipts, only 23% saying that all companies keep only 
one set of books, and only 18% saying that all companies pay taxes honestly.98 
                                            




Table 6.   Philippine Perception of Private Sector Corruption99 
 
c. Summary of Findings 
The SWS Surveys of Enterprises conducted from 2000-2005 
indicate that public sector corruption is dismally high and that 95% of managers 
surveyed indicated seeing at least “a little” corruption in the private sector. “They 
reveal that while, on the one hand corruption has hardly budged in the past five 
years, on the other hand the private sector’s indignation and willingness to 
participate, both financially and personally, in fighting corruption has been 
growing rapidly.”100 Transparency International’s 2006 Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) “shows the machinery of corruption remains well-oiled, despite 
improved legislation”101 with the Philippines obtaining a CPI score of 2.5.102 
Thirteen surveys were used to calculate the Philippines’ CPI score which proved 
to be low enough to rank it 126 out of 163 countries analyzed. On a positive note, 
those interviewed by SWS tallied the cost of corruption and the potential returns 
from defeating it and indicated they would support anti-corruption efforts and that 
an anti-corruption program is a good investment103 (Table 7). 
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Table 7.   Willingness to Support Groups Fighting Corruption104 
 
3. Measures Employed to Control Graft and Corruption 
The Philippine government employs a number of legal measures and anti-
corruption bodies to combat the problem of graft and corruption. Some of the 
more important measures include: 
• The 1987 Philippine Constitution:  Article XI, Section 1 of the 
1987 Philippine Constitution, states that public office is a public 
trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be 
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, 
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and 
lead modest lives. Article XI, Section II states that the President, 
Vice-President, members of the Constitutional Commissions and 
the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for 
bribery and graft and corruption.105 
• Republic Act No. 3019:  This act defines corrupt practices of any 
public officer, declares them unlawful, and provides the 
corresponding penalties of imprisonment, perpetual disqualification 
from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture of unexplained 
wealth in favor of the government.106 
• Republic Act No. 6713:  This act promotes a high standard of 
ethics and requires all government personnel to make an accurate 
statement of assets and liabilities, disclose net worth and financial  
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connections. It also requires new public officials to divest ownership 
in any private enterprise within 30 days from assumption of office to 
avoid conflict of interest.107 
• Republic Act No. 6770:  This act provides the functional and 
structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman which will 
be discussed more in depth in section 4 of this chapter. 
• Republic Act No. 7080:  This act penalizes any public officer who 
by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by 
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, accumulates or 
acquires ill-gotten wealth, through a combination of series of event 
criminal acts, an aggregate amount to total value of at least 
seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000).108 
• Republic Act No. 8249:  This classifies the Sandiganbayan as a 
special court and places it on par with the Court of Appeals.109 
• Presidential Decree No. 46:  Declares it unlawful for government 
personnel to receive gifts and for private persons to give gifts on 
any occasion including Christmas, regardless of whether the gift is 
for past or future favors. It also prohibits entertaining public officials 
and their relatives.110 
• Presidential Decree No. 677:  Requires the Statement of Assets 
and Liabilities to be submitted every year.111 
• Presidential Decree No. 749:  Grants immunity from prosecution 
to givers of bribes and other gifts and to their accomplices in bribery 
charges if they testify against the public officials or private persons 
guilty of those offenses.112 
• Office of the Ombudsman (OMB):  The OMB investigates and 
acts on complaints filed against public officials and employees, and 
serves as the people’s watchdog of the government. 
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• The Civil Service Commission (CSC):  The CSC is the central 
agency of the government mandated to establish a career service 
and promote moral, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, 
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It has jurisdiction 
over administrative cases including graft and corruption brought 
before it on appeal. 
• The Commission on Audit (COA):  The COA is the watchdog of 
the financial operations of the government. It is empowered to 
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue 
and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property 
under the custody of government agencies and instrumentalities. It 
shall promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations for 
the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, 
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or use of 
government funds and properties.113 
• The Sandiganbayan:  The Sandiganbayan is the anti-graft court of 
the Philippines. It has jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases 
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses 
committed by public officers and employees. It is in charge of 
maintaining morality, integrity and efficiency in the public service. 
4. Anti-Graft / Corruption Proceedings 
From the information presented above regarding the prevalence of 
corruption in the Philippines, there appears to be a justifiable public perception of 
corruption in the judicial, executive, and legislative branches. “The perception 
remains of a ‘very high’ and ‘steady’ level of corruption in public agencies.”114 As 
a result, both the government and the private sector have established a number 
of anticorruption bodies including the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) and an 
anticorruption court known as Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan has “jurisdiction 
over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other 
offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in 
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be 
determined by law.115 The OMB is charged with the following duties:  
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1. as watchdog, it oversees the general and specific performance of 
official functions to the end that the laws are properly administered.  
2. as mobilizer, it ensures that the government provides steady and 
efficient delivery of basic services.  
3. as official critic, it evaluates existing procedures and practices in 
government with the view of refining them. 
4. as dispenser of justice, it imposes administrative sanctions on 
erring government officials and employees, and prosecutes them in 
court for criminal offenses. 116 
Specifically, the Office of the Ombudsman is mandated to serve as the lead 
agency in the total war against graft and corruption with the ultimate objective of 
restoring integrity and efficiency in the government service.117 
The OMB released its Annual Report in 2005 which listed several high 
profile cases that were opened against high-ranking military officers and against 
officials in the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Bureau of 
Customs, and the Department of Transportation and Communication. The 2005 
Annual Report also included cases brought before the Sandiganbayan. Some of 
the more notable cases are listed below. 
a. Military 
(1) Case No.: OMB-P-C-03-1439-L.118  A complaint filed 
against a Brigadier General, a Major, an engineer from Philippine Air Force and 
an engineer from Eduard Enterprises (all individuals unnamed) was made 
following an investigation report from the Military Support Unit Cebu (MSUC), 
AFP Logistics Center, Cebu City, and the AFP Office of the Inspector General 
declaring the loss of four caterpillar generators at the Mactan Benito Ebuen Air 
Base.  
Facts presented to OMB and pieces of evidence obtained by 
Ombudsman investigators revealed the existence of a conspiracy among the 
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accused individuals. Upon further investigation, it was found that the generators 
were sold for a loss without proper authorization. The sale of the equipment for a 
losing price and absent the conduct of public bidding was disadvantageous to the 
government, thereby making the Philippine Air Force officers liable for 
malversation (corrupt behavior in public office) of government property and 
violation of Anti-Graft  Law. The Brigadier General, being the immediate 
administrator of all the properties within his area of control, was responsible for 
the safekeeping of the four generators yet did not prevent their anomalous 
disposition. The Major admitted participation from the time he verified the status 
of the generators to the time the same were released from the base. An Engineer 
was liable for he facilitated the unlawful sale of the generators to the would-be-
buyer from the Eduard Enterprises. 
(2) Case No.: OMB-P-C-0185-A and OMB-P-C-05-0184-
A.119  A Lieutenant General from Air Force Logistics and Support Command, his 
family, sister and brother-in-law were investigated by the Office of the 
Ombudsman. The case involved a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and 
Republic Act No. 1379 for owning and acquiring properties which are manifestly 
out of proportion to salary and other legitimate family income. OMB ordered the 
filing of a petition for the forfeiture of the respondents’ unexplained wealth 
amounting to Php135,280,822.11 ($2,766,478.98US). The accused owned 
several acres of land in Bukidnon and Rizal, condominiums in the Philippines, a 
house and land in the United States, several vehicles, and other properties which 
are out of proportion to his income as a public officer and his other lawful income. 
Further, the Ombudsman found the respondent liable for 
eleven (11) counts of Perjury. The failure of the respondent to declare all his 
properties in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth from 1993 to 
2003 made him liable for Perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code. 
He was also found guilty for administrative offenses of Grave Misconduct and 
Dishonesty which carry the penalty of dismissal from the service. However, since 
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the respondent already retired from the service in 2004, such penalty of dismissal 
from service could no longer be imposed. Accordingly, in view of such finding, 
the Ombudsman found him not entitled to claim any retirement benefit and other 
benefits, and is declared perpetually disqualified from entering public service 
again. 
(3) Case No.: OMB-P-C-05-0289-B and OMB-P-A-05-
0263-B.120  The Comptroller of the Armed Forces and his family were charged 
with plunder and several counts of perjury before the Sandiganbayan. Based on 
the criminal information for plunder, the accused Comptroller able to “amass, 
accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth in the form of funds, landholdings and 
other real and personal properties, in the aggregate amount of 
Php303,272,005.99 in conspiracy with members of his immediate family and 
other persons.”121  
The Perjury case stemmed from the alleged failure of the 
former comptroller to include in his Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Net 
worth (SALN) for the years 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 certain motor vehicles 
owned by him and his family such as a Toyota Previa, a Mitsubishi L-300 Van de 
Luxe, and a 1997 Honda Civic. Additionally, deposits and investments he made 
in the Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association, amounting to 
Php12,003,117.70 were not included in his SALN for the year 2000. 
b. Government 
(1) Case No.: OMB-C-A-05-0358-G.122  An administrative 
case associated with Grave Misconduct was filed against the City Councilor of 
Manila. The complainant alleged that the City Councilor demanded 
Php1,200,000 from her in connection with the complainant’s application to renew 
the Abucay Market Corporation franchise. The OMB found that the respondent 
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was characterized by “corruption and clear intent to violate the law showing the 
commission of the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct.”123 
The Office of the Ombudsman found the respondent guilty of 
Grave Misconduct and levied against the City Councilor the penalty of dismissal 
from the service with the additional penalty of forfeiture of retirement benefits and 
perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service. 
(2) Case No.: OMB-C-C-03-0729-L, OMB-V-C-0240-E, 
and OMB-V-A-02-0214-E.124  These cases were the result of an exposé made by 
the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism against the former District 
Revenue Officer of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in Talisay City and now 
reassigned as Chief Revenue Officer in Cebu City. The cases stem from 
violations of Republic Act No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the 
State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by any Public 
Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Therefor) and Republic Act 
No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and 
Employees). 
The investigation conducted on the official revealed that he 
and his wife maintained an account in three separate Cebu-based banks in the 
amount of Pph5,793,881.39. After thorough investigation, the OMB found 
probable cause to dismiss the Revenue Officer from service for the 
administrative offense of Dishonesty and ordered the forfeiture of the 
respondent’s benefits, cancellation of his eligibility, and his perpetual 
disqualification to hold public office. “A criminal case was also filed before the 
appropriate court against the respondent, for acquiring unexplained wealth 
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as a government official and for failure 
to disclose his properties in his SALN.”125 
 
                                            





Filipino society is built around the concepts of pakikisama (getting along 
well with others) and utang na loob (debt of gratitude). These concepts create 
strong patron-client relations and a close knit hierarchy that links the poor to the 
rich. Unfortunately, these concepts are abused to the point that public and private 
sectors are rife with corruption. Filipinos foster and build these interpersonal 
relationships by bribing government and local officials in exchange for basic civil 
services or assisting friends and family to get jobs or construction contracts. At 
the lowest levels, bribes are given for everything from driver’s licenses to building 
permits. From a Filipino perspective, there is nothing wrong with this behavior. It 
is simply seen as a way to get through modern society and maintain personal 
relationships as well as a way to take care of immediate and extended family and 
friends.  
The Philippines has at its disposal many avenues with which to combat 
corrupt behavior within the government and military. As illustrated earlier, the 
state has a comprehensive set of laws on the books and several organizations 
capable of investigating alleged instances of graft and corruption. The anti-
corruption agencies (i.e., OMB, CSC, COA, and Sandiganbayan) have been 
given ample power to identify and punish offenders and recognize the burden 
associated with holding a position of power and have given priority to catching 
the “big fish” and grave offences vis-à-vis the acts of lower ranking personnel 
(e.g., Presidential Decree No. 749). The Philippine state approaches corruption 
from both a preventive and punitive point of view with officials recognizing that 
the task of combating corruption lies not only with the government. As such, they 
have enlisted civil society in the struggle. For their part, the citizenry have 
indicated willingness, in cooperation with state agencies or by themselves, to 
fighting corruption (Table 7 and Figure 3).  
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Figure 3.   Percentage of Income Willing to Pay for Fight on Corruption126 
 
On whole, the Philippine approach towards combating corruption has used 
democratic means, often relying on due process, transparent procedures, and 
choice in effecting many of its aspirations. Yet corruption remains widespread 
with millions of dollars lost each year that could have be used to fund 
counterinsurgency operations in the fight against communist insurgents or used 
to increase the quality of life of the Philippine’s poorest communities.  
Total losses due to corruption cannot be measured solely on a financial 
basis. For example, Eric Batalla states that  
…the amount of financial losses does not constitute the entire cost 
of corruption to the Philippines. Yet this cost cannot be simply 
quantified in financial terms. One must impute the effects of 
corruption on productivity, prices, incomes, and employment of an 
entire range of existing and potential economic sectors…The  
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relationship between corruption and underdevelopment has been 
suggested before. Corruption is anti-development because it goes 
against efficiency, social equity, and welfare.127 
The United Nations Development Programme echoes Batalla’s claim by 
adding that in a country such as the Philippines, where corruption is endemic,  
…the consequences are disproportionately and cruelly borne by the 
poor who have no resources to compete with those able and willing 
to pay bribes. In the end, corruption tightens the shackles of 
poverty on countries that can least afford it, on societies that need 
every dollar to pay for important social and economic programs.128 
In the end, the system that is supposed to provide basic services for the 
military and the civilian population is abused which results in economic 
underdevelopment to the tune of millions in lost revenue and a reputation of 
national weakness. Estimates of the financial loss due to corruption in the 
Philippines vary from source to source; however, it is likely that revenue essential 
to ensuring military and economic success in combating the influence of the 
CPP-NPA has been grossly depleted by senior officials in the government and 
military.  
The effect this has had on the state’s ability to combat the communist 
insurgency is readily apparent. For example, money siphoned from the state’s 
coffers by senior military officers lines their pockets and those of their families 
instead of being used to fund military modernization programs. The lost revenue 
hinders the military’s ability to conduct successful operations because it remains 
under-funded and ill-equipped to combat the insurgents. Additionally, as more 
cases alleging corruption by senior military and government officials are brought 
before the OMB and Sandiganbayan, public support and opinion for these 
organizations are further eroded which allows the CPP-NPA to sit back and 
watch the armed forces collapse under the weight of corruption scandals and 
questions of loyalty to the government. 
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D. POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 
A majority of the Philippine population continues to live in poverty-stricken 
rural areas, where they depend primarily on the agricultural sector for their 
livelihood, but do not benefit from secure access to land. Inequality in ownership 
and control over land remains acute and is more extreme than most analysts 
have previously imagined.129 Additionally, “the legal peasant movement and the 
underground communist movement have continued to organize and wage war 
around demands for land redistribution…because skewed access to land is still 
and important source of not only economic deprivation but also political 
domination.”130 
1. Governance and Poverty 
The 1986 People Power revolution that ousted Ferdinand Marcos and the 
2001 People Power revolution that removed Estrada from the political scene 
were both significant milestones in Philippine political development, which paved 
the way for strengthened democratic institutions in the country. The Asian 
Development bank notes, however, that “while much has been achieved in the 
process of democratization since then, events of recent years have spawned a 
sense of disappointment over the ability of the political system to address the 
needs of Philippine society, and particularly the poor.”131 From the information 
presented in an earlier section of this thesis on weak political parties, we know 
that politics is the main source of the economic problems (i.e., poverty and 
inequality) confronting the country today. That is to say that “weak governance 
seems to be the major contributory factor for the economy’s lackluster 
performance and the insignificant impacts on poverty over the years.”132 
According to the Asian Development Bank, a weak and inefficient state is 
characterized by the inability to efficiently deliver the necessary services to its 
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population as a result of low capacity. One main reason the Philippine 
Government is unable to deliver necessary services to the population is an 
inability to collect sufficient revenues.133 A second reason is the country’s 
cumbersome bureaucracy, run by close to 1.5 million civil servants and 
structurally challenged by  
1. weak mechanisms for planning, agenda-setting, and policy-making; 
2. a failure to implement and maintain an appropriate performance 
management and measurement system;  
3. an overly large bureaucracy that is nevertheless plagued with gaps, 
overlaps, and duplication of functions, activities, and jurisdiction at 
all levels;  
4. overemphasis on rules and procedures instead of directing 
resources towards the realization of intended outcomes and 
impacts; 
5. highly politicized bureaucracy with opportunities for rent seeking; 
6. lack of managerial and technical competencies; and  
7. wrong mindsets, attitudes, and corporate culture.134 
A prime example of the state’s inability to reduce poverty and inequality is 
that as of 2003, nearly half of the country’s farmland remained owned by a small 
handful of families who were descendents of Spanish colonizers, half of the 
working class were landless laborers, and land reform had largely floundered. 
Additionally, the influential landowning Philippine elite have consistently dragged 
their feet on agrarian reform with the wealthy landowners often preferring instead 
to let their land go to seed rather than see it turned over to their tenants.135  By 
the end of 2005, there had been talk of reform but little real progress had taken 
place in the face of the country’s entrenched problems of poverty, social 
inequality, and indebtedness.  
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Without the support of the government, many of the country’s poor and 
disenchanted turn to those who “care” about them—the communists. This, 
combined with the AFP’s inability to mount a large-scale counterinsurgency 
operation, is one reason why the CPP-NPA numbers have remained stable and 
have not significantly decreased in recent years in light of democratic rule. The 
rural population’s poor have supplied the CPP-NPA with a constant supply of 
fresh recruits, provided them with safe havens, and given them food and supplies 
necessary to wage their protracted struggle against a government that appears 
increasingly unwilling to alleviate rural poverty. 
2. Conflict and Poverty 
Where security is not maintained, underdevelopment and poverty are the 
result, particularly where armed conflicts arise. Given the perpetual nature of the 
Philippine insurgencies, it should come as no surprise to see that poverty and 
underdevelopment are both rampant in the Philippines. For example, the CIA 
World Factbook 2007 reveals that 40 percent of Filipinos live below the poverty 
line.136 Conflict between the Philippine government and communist insurgents 
has resulted in the decline of the state’s democratic political processes; military 
actors have increased their influence over subordinates, and the rule of law 
outside the confines of the urban centers has often broken down. Conflict is 
inextricably linked with chronic poverty.137 
The Asian Development has indicated that conflict has a negative effect 
on all five forms of capital. For example, 
1. Human Capital:  Conflict leads to deaths, disablement and 
displacement; decline in capacity of the state to provide health and 
education services; declining literacy, life expectancy, increased 
infant mortality rates and higher levels of stunting; higher 
dependency ratios; long term effects are a poorly educated and 
skilled workforce and a future generation which has known nothing 
but violence. 
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2. Financial Capital:  Conflict impacts negatively on financial 
institutions, investments, markets, rates of economic growth, and 
investment levels; market decline, lack of credit, and outflow of 
capital are a result. 
3. Social Capital:  Conflict disrupts social relations and causes social 
dislocation and a decline in trust and reciprocity. 
4. Natural Capital: Conflict leads to a breakdown of customary rights 
and rules of usage, lack of management and investment in natural 
resources, and increased use of marginal lands. Predatory 
behavior leads to resource depletion and environmental 
degradation.  
5. Physical Capital: Conflict causes destruction of and lack of 
investment in infrastructure and services. 
Within the Philippines, this is a particularly valid representation of what 
has happened within many of the rural areas. For example, James Hookway 
suggests that a lack of infrastructure (i.e., effects on physical capital) has 
produced a lack of jobs, which is why relatively few guerillas take advantage of 
government amnesty programs. Simply, there are few other ways to make a 
living; therefore, people remain within the CPP-NPA’s ranks or turn to them as a 
means to survive. As a result, the CPP-NPA benefit from increased revenue from 
revolutionary taxes and a sustained manpower pool. However, revolutionary 
taxes collected by the NPA are crippling rural development (i.e., dwindling human 
capital) because those residents and business owners in the rural portions of the 
Philippines not supportive of the CPP-NPA are moving away in order to seek the 
relative security of metropolitan areas. This has created a vicious cycle whereby 
the poor who seek out the CPP-NPA for assistance due to a lack of infrastructure 
actually contribute to the problem because they create a deficit in human capital. 
The lack of human capital cripples development necessary to alleviate some of 
the problems, so the poor turn to the CPP-NPA and the cycle begins anew. 
E. MILITARY LIMITATIONS 
Stoking rural discontent and antigovernment unrest, the CPP and the New 
People’s Army have managed to remain a thorn in the side of the military for 
almost four decades. Violence has escalated during the past several years with 
Philippine military officials identifying a familiar foe—communist agitators. 
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Unfortunately, the AFP’s ability to combat the communist insurgency has been 
limited by dissent within the officer corps, corruption, lack of training, and 
insufficient equipment and has undoubtedly contributed to the persistency of the 
insurgency. For instance, the lack of modern, functional equipment and poor 
coordination between intelligence and operational units are key factors for why 
the AFP has been largely unable to defeat the NPA.138  Additionally, the results 
of a Joint Defense Assessment between the U.S. Pacific Command and the AFP 
revealed a wide range of weakness in the AFP’s operational capabilities, such as 
a lack of ground mobility and air assault capability, intelligence collection, 
analysis and dissemination, communications equipment, and civic action. The 
institutional rot of the AFP is more serious than a mere matter of inadequate 
funding.   
1.  The Philippine Army 
The Philippine Army is the country's dominant military force with 
approximately 80,000 troops and accounts for the bulk of defense expenditure in 
line with the leading role in countering insurgent and terrorist groups.139 Analysts 
at Jane’s Defence suggest that while years of combat have given the army 
extensive operational experience, it has often failed to capitalize on this hard-won 
knowledge through systematic and regular training and indoctrination.140  The 
army also has problems fusing command and control (C2) with intelligence 
functions and lacks professionalism due to a weak non-commissioned officer 
corps and politicized officer corps.141  
The United States has assisted the Philippine Army since 9/11 by 
delivering both weapons and equipment. For example, the delivery of 30,000 M-
16 rifles from the U.S. as part of an overall strategy to modernize the Philippine 
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military has helped ensure infantry units in regular contact with communist 
insurgents have a reliable personal weapon. However, poor discipline and lack of 
adequate training with a weapon such as the M-16, which is notoriously difficult 
to maintain, has led to the equipment not always being correctly maintained and 
combat ready.142  
Mobility is also a problem for the Army as there is a critical requirement for 
both ground and air transport to move troops into combat and to evacuate 
wounded personnel. The current Philippine Army equipment inventory or Order 
of Battle (OB) includes numerous pieces of artillery, recoilless rifles, infantry 
weapons and more than 400 armored vehicles.143 The army’s weakness lies in 
its ability to utilize these pieces of equipment where they are required. For 
example, the Philippines is slightly larger in size than the state of Arizona 
(300,000 sq km).144 However, use of armored personnel carriers to ferry troops 
into skirmishes is severely limited by mountainous terrain and thick jungles. The 
army’s ability to airlift troops to the fight is also severely limited; however, this will 
be addressed in greater detail within the Philippine Air Force (PAF) section 
because the PAF operates and maintains the fleet of fixed wing and rotary 
aircraft. 
The constant demands of the counter-insurgency campaigns have 
been a feature of national life since the end of the Second War and 
has largely frustrated any attempts to move the army much beyond 
the level of a gendarmerie. 145 
This factor and the frequent—and often politically inspired—turnover of 
senior officers have made it difficult to sustain and implement long-term military 
planning.146 One of the recommendations of a Joint Defense Assessment (JDA) 
endorsed by President Arroyo in 2003 was the stabilization of the senior military 
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leadership. In common with most of her predecessors, however, President 
Arroyo continues to follow the “revolving door” policy, which ensures senior 
officers due for retirement are appointed into positions of authority. While this 
may have a negative impact on innovation and ambition, it does serve to ensure 
most senior officers remain loyal to the president when they are at the peak of 
their authority.  
The officers and enlisted men who joined the Oakwood Mutiny in 2003 
levied serious allegations of corruption in the military establishment. In November 
2003, the AFP created a 6,000-member National Capital Region Command to 
guard against future coup attempts and insurgent and terrorist activities in the 
Manila area. Attempts to destabilize the government continued into 2004 with the 
revelation of a second coup plot involving junior officers and a campaign by 
retired senior officers to postpone the May election and replace the Arroyo 
administration with a caretaker military-civilian administration. As with the 2003 
attempt, this one failed as well. In February 2006, yet another coup plot surfaced 
involving the Philippine Marines and the elite Scout Rangers. By early 2007, at 
least 30 AFP personnel, including two senior generals (former Marine Corps 
commander Major General Renato Miranda and Scout Ranger regiment 
commander Brigadier General Danilo Lim) faced mutiny charges over their 
alleged role in the reported plot.  
In the past few years serious sanctions have been imposed against 
those involved in such demonstrations of military defiance to civil 
authority. Most of the 300 personnel tried by courts martial for their 
role in a July 2003 plot against Arroyo later returned to duty after 
admitting their involvement. However, AFP commander General 
Esperon has said he intends to make an example of the 2006 
plotters. Given the widespread skepticism over the allegations, it is 
unlikely that the AFP would risk triggering further rifts within the 
military by imposing any career threatening sentences on the 
accused. The end result of the process may well reconfirm the 
complex and volatile relationship between the armed forces and 
their civilian leaders.147 
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The real problem with lies within the officer corps and a culture of indifference 
within sections of the military towards the state’s often flawed democratic process 
and weak civil institutions.148 
2. The Philippine Air Force 
The Philippine Air Force effectively became an aerial arm of the ground 
forces after losing its air combat capability when the last of its F-5A/B fighter 
squadrons were disbanded and the aircraft retired between 2005 and 2006. The 
PAF has never recovered from the U.S. Air Force's (USAF) withdrawal from 
Clark Air Base in the early 1990s. The USAF’s withdrawal meant that the PAF 
could no longer depend upon the USAF for aircraft, parts, and maintenance. “The 
PAF's equipment degraded to a point where cannibalization and adaptation—for 
example, converting trainers into limited role combat aircraft—were required to 
maintain any war fighting capabilities.”149 The air force's ability to provide prompt 
close air support, troop insertion and medical evacuation missions are key assets 
in ground combat operations against Muslim and communist insurgent groups in 
mountainous and thickly forested terrain settings. The retirement of PAF's F-
5A/Bs leaves the air force with no fighter platforms. With the elimination of the 
PAF's last F-5A/B unit, the air force is left without any jet interceptor capability. 
The national air defense role will be accomplished by armed versions of the S211 
trainer. Today, the most capable counterinsurgency platforms in the PAF's 
inventory are the OV-10F counterinsurgency (COIN) fighter-bomber and the C-
130 medium airlift aircraft. 
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Figure 4.   Philippine C-130 and OV-10150 
 
The PAF has begun the process of undertaking a modest modernization 
program that will carry the Philippine Air Force though 2018. “In January 2007 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo announced a Php10 billion (USD200million) 
defense spending program that included the purchase of 26 helicopters.”151 The 
program has thus far focused on troop transport and tactical support for ground 
forces and in all likelihood, this will remain the PAF's primary role for the 
foreseeable future. The announcement that additional funding would be allocated 
for additional PAF platforms will help address a perennial shortfall in transport 
and attack helicopters needed for counterinsurgency operations. However, there 
is little likelihood that the Philippines’ lack of modern air defense or strike aircraft 
will be addressed during the remainder of this decade. 
Various military surplus programs continue to provide the bulk of the air 
force's additional platforms, although this usually involves the transfer of old-
                                            
150 “Philippine Air Force,” http://www.aero-image.com/photo_gallery.htmhttp://www.aero-
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model aircraft that require a level of maintenance support that stretches local 
resources.152 Despite assistance from the United States and Singapore with 
helicopters and other equipment, the PAF's inventory remains unbalanced (Table 
8). This is unlikely to be addressed in the medium to long-term given the air 
force's low priority in defense spending. Transport requirements are of higher 
priority for the PAF, reflecting a renewed emphasis on internal security and the 
need to rapidly deploy ground forces. However, as upgrades are favored over 
new acquisitions, there is little likelihood that the AFP will sanction the acquisition 
of any new major transport or combat aircraft for the PAF in the foreseeable 
future.  
 
Designation Equipment Type Qty Origin Delivery Manufacturer 
UH-1H Utility Helicopter 20 Singapore 2004 Huey (refurbished by Singapore 
Technologies Aerospace) 
UH-1H Utility Helicopter 3 US 2003 Huey 
UH-1H Utility Helicopter 5 US 2002 Huey 
OV-10A Support Aircraft 14 US 1992 Rockwell 
OV-10C Support Aircraft 4 Thailand 2003 Boeing 
OV-10F Support Aircraft 5 US 1991 Rockwell 
Blue Horizon UAV 2 Israel 2001 EMIT Aviation 
L-39ZA Jet Trainer 18 Czech 1995 Aero Vodochody 
MD 520MG Helicopter 6 US 1992 McDonnell Douglas 
MD 500D Helicopter 22 US 1990/2 McDonnell Douglas 
S-211 Jet Trainer 36 Italy 1989/92 Agusta 
SF 260TP Trainer Aircraft 16 Italy 1989/92 Agusta 
Table 8.   PAF Military Procurement153 
 
As is illustrated above, current PAF priorities lie with the acquisition of 
transport and attack helicopters to support the AFP's declared campaign to 
combat and ultimately neutralize the Islamic and communist insurgencies by 
2010.154 This requirement is being at least partly met with the help of surplus 
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U.S. UH-1H and other platforms. The U.S. has taken a proactive role to address 
the critical deficiency in tactical mobility which has hindered counter-insurgency 
operations. For example, the U.S. agreed to supply 20 UH-1H Iroquois utility 
helicopters to the PAF as they became available along with an additional ten to 
ensure Philippine maintainers have sufficient spare parts to keep the aircraft 
serviceable.155 PAF has responded by focusing virtually all its assets and 
resources in providing support for ground forces engaged in counter-insurgency 
operations. 
Overall, the PAF's capabilities remain weak, and in the case of air defense 
and strike are almost completely deficient. Serviceability rates among operational 
platforms are rarely above 60 per cent, while many aircraft listed in the order of 
battle inventory are effectively operating beyond their service life (Table 9). This 
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156 Between January 2006 and January 2007 the PAF lost at least two OV-10 Broncos and 
two MD520 helicopter gunships in separate accidents. For more information, see U.S. Marine 
Corps, “Crash Fire Rescue teams respond to Philippine OV-10 aircraft mishap,” 3d Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade Public Affairs, October 24, 2006 http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink 
/mcn2000.nsf/0/113EECBA3A097B1085257211003AB83F?   open document (accessed March 
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Fixed Wing Aircraft 
Type Role Original Total In Service First Delivery 
OV-10A Bronco Counterinsurgency 24 6  1991 
OV-10C Bronco Counterinsurgency 8 7 2003 
C-130B Hercules Transport 9 71 1991 
C-130H Hercules Transport 3 21 1976 
L-100-20 
Hercules 
Transport 5 31 1973 
N22B Nomad 
Missionmaster 
Transport 14 5 1975 
F27-200 
Friendship 
Transport 8 72 1959 
F27-500 
Friendship 
Transport 1 1 2006 
S211 Armed Trainer 24 153 1989 
T-41D Mescalero Trainer 36 13 1968 
R172 Hawk XP Trainer 7 6 1997 
SF-260TP Trainer 18 124 1993 
1. The majority of PAF C-130s are grounded, but two C-130Bs, one C-130H, and two L-100s are 
active with more airframes to be refurbished and returned to service within the next few years. 
2. Only two or three active; remainder in storage 
3. Only four believed to be active, with another four due to be returned to airworthy condition. 
4. Excluding 18 that were reportedly to be converted from SF-260MP; only one such conversion 
has been confirmed in PAF service. 
Rotary Wing Aircraft 
MD-520MG Combat 28 18 1990 
S-76 Combat 12 3 1984 
SA-330L Communications 2 1 1978 
S-70A-5 Communications 2 1 1984 
S-76A Communications 5 3 1984 
UH-1H Utility 180+ 50 1969 
205A Utility 15 5 1984 
412EP Utility 4 4 1984 
412SP Utility 2 2 1984 
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3. Conclusion 
The Philippine Army suffers from poor discipline and a lack of adequate 
training. For instance, deficiencies in training and discipline with weapons such 
as the M-16, which is notoriously difficult to maintain, has led to the equipment 
not always being correctly maintained and combat ready. Additionally, the Army 
suffers from adequate mobility. To successfully combat the NPA, there is a 
critical requirement for both ground and air transport to move troops into combat 
and to evacuate wounded personnel from the engagements. Currently, these 
capabilities are noticeably deficient. Also, while the Philippine Army OB includes 
numerous pieces of artillery, recoilless rifles, infantry weapons and more than 
400 armored vehicles, the army’s weakness lies in its ability to utilize these 
pieces of equipment where they are required. For example, use of armored 
personnel carriers to ferry troops into skirmishes against the NPA is severely 
limited by mountainous terrain and thick jungles.  
The air force's ability to provide prompt close air support, troop insertion, 
and medical evacuation missions are keys to supporting ground combat 
operations against communist insurgents in mountainous and thickly forested 
terrain settings. However, the military’s ability to airlift troops to the fight and 
provide close air support is limited. Today, the most capable counterinsurgency 
platforms in the PAF's inventory are the OV-10F fighter-bomber and the C-130 
medium airlift aircraft. Overall, the PAF's capabilities remain weak, and in the 
case of air defense and strike missions are almost completely deficient. 
Serviceability rates among operational platforms are rarely above 60 per cent 
and many aircraft listed in the PAF’s inventory are effectively operating beyond 
their service life. 
Equipment deficiencies such as those listed above have effectively tied 
the hands of the Army and Air Force in their quest to eliminate the communist 
threat. In order to be effective against a rural insurgency such as that posed by 
the CPP-NPA, the Armed Forces of the Philippines must invest heavily in tactical 
airlift platforms that can easily insert troops to gain contact with the enemy and 
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evacuate the injured. Until they do so, the CPP-NPA will benefit from using 
terrain and maneuver to launch hit and run attacks against the armed forces. The 
CPP’s founder, Jose Maria Sison has indicated that  
the NPA can bleed the AFP to death by launching tactical 
offensives everyday on a nationwide scale. It can watch its enemy 
clearly and can use effectively the tactics of concentration, 
dispersal and shifting. On the other hand, the AFP are deaf and 
blind and are confounded by the dilemma of concentration and 
dispersal in a fluid war of movement in which the NPA does not 
maintain fixed positions and fixed lines.158  
CPP spokesman Gregorio "Ka Roger" Rosal echoes this sentiment by 
saying that the AFP will fail in their quest to eliminate the NPA’s guerilla fronts 
because 
 the combat troops of the AFP can only cover at most 10% of the 
areas of operation of the NPA. The NPA fighters can easily shift 
from 'hard areas' to accelerate mass work and organizing in the 
other 90% of its territory where AFP forces are absent or are 
spread out thinly.159 
The AFP has been unsuccessful in eliminating the communist threat 
because they want to win a war of quick decision by deploying large units as well 
as special operations teams, while the NPA pursues the strategic line of 
protracted people’s war, accumulating armed strength in the countryside, and 
encircling the cities until the time comes for seizing the cities on a nationwide 
scale.160 So far, this tactic has proved useful and has inflicted almost as many 
casualties on the AFP as they have inflicted on the NPA (Table 1). Currently, it 
appears that both the NPA and AFP are locked in a stalemate with neither side 
able to gain the tactical advantage over the other. In addition to the factors 
mentioned earlier in this thesis, this stalemate has certainly accounted for the 
persistence of the communist insurgency.  
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The CPP considers the AFP an oppressive instrument of the United 
States and the local exploiting classes of big compradors (intermediary or go-
between) and landlords, while the NPA fights for the national and democratic 
rights of the working class, peasantry, and the rest of the Filipino people.161 
According to CPP Chairman Jose Maria Sison, “the AFP is hated by the people 
more than ever before because they commit gross human rights violations, reek 
with corruption, and act like the private armies of the Arroyo ruling clique which 
has used them for electoral fraud and for the repression of the people and the 
legal opposition through intimidation, extrajudicial killings and abductions.”162 As 
long as these perceptions exist, the CPP-NPA will continue to draw support from 
thousands of supporters who see the AFP as an oppressive instrument of and 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Weakness of the Philippine state has failed to bring an end to nearly four 
decades of communist armed conflict which has been characterized by 
government and military responses that are dominated by pacification and victory 
positions. Additionally, the absence of an institutional policy option (i.e., 
addressing the root causes underlying the insurgency, closing the gap between 
rich and poor, de-politicizing, training and equipping the military, reducing 
corruption, and functioning as a government of the people, not against the 
people) results from state weakness in the Philippines. From the information 
presented in this thesis, a clearer picture of why the Philippine communist 
insurgency has persisted for nearly four decades has emerged. The literature 
reviewed and the data obtained during the research for this thesis points to state 
weakness as a key element for the communist insurgency’s persistence.  
State weakness is considered a precondition in numerous theories of 
revolution. For example, Theda Skocpol argues that a weakened state is ripe for 
revolution to occur. Robert Rotberg asserts that weak states are distinguished 
from strong states, “according to the levels of their effective delivery of the most 
crucial political goods.”163 Among these are the security of borders, elimination of 
domestic threats, prevention of crime, and facilitation of peaceful dispute 
resolution.164  Weak states suffer from internal antagonisms, management flaws, 
greed, despotism, or external attacks. “In weak states, the various infrastructural 
and economic networks that characterize strong states have deteriorated, 
corruption has increased, and autocrats often rule.”165   
The Philippines fits the definition of a chronically weak state suffering from 
a dysfunctional political and economic system beset by accusations of crime and 
corruption, is characterized by extremes of wealth and poverty, and suffers from                                             
163 Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and 
Indicators,” in State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, ed. Robert I. Rotberg 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 4. 
164 William M. Wise, 2. 
165 Robert I. Rotberg, 4. 
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immature civil-military relations, and a host of insurgencies from both Muslim 
separatists and persistent communist rebels. State weakness is apparent as 
witnessed by weak political parties, contested outcomes, coups attempts, and a 
politicized military that is limited by equipment and training deficiencies. 
Additionally, rampant corruption and the state’s inability to close the gap between 
the rich few and the many poor has created a permissive environment which the 
CPP-NPA has been able to exploit. The pervasiveness of rural poverty has taken 
its toll on the ability of the government to portray itself as “concerned with the 
people.” Consequently, the CPP-NPA has easily exploited this and been able to 
replenish its ranks over the years.  
A. WEAK POLITICAL PARTIES 
The weak political party system now in place in the Philippines allows 
politicians to switch political parties to that of the ruling party. As long as 
politicians feel free or obligated to switch political parties, there cannot and will 
not be a “representative” government in place to look after the needs of the 
masses over the needs of the elite. For instance, during each of the major 
congressional elections, a minority party has won enough seats to mount a 
successful minority political opposition on their own or as part of a coalition. 
However, legislators from the minority parties jumped ship to join the party of the 
President in order to receive a greater piece of the budgetary pie.  
This directly contributes to the communist insurgency because as party 
members leave their constituency (i.e., the rural poor) behind, the peasants turn 
to the open arms of the CPP-NPA because they are viewed as “representing the 
needs of the people.” Part of the problem lies in the fact that in the Philippines, “it 
is not the election of members of the legislature that determines the governing 
majority in government. It is the election of the president. Once a president is 
elected, he or she becomes the center of political power.”166 Until legislative 
officials are elected by their respective constituency based on their political 
platforms alone and party switching outlawed, the countries’ rural poor will 
continue to turn to the CPP-NPA for assistance that they are not getting from 
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their elected officials. Unfortunately, when you have a president (e.g., Arroyo) 
who herself switched parties, it becomes difficult to implement such a policy 
change. 
B. MILITARY LIMITATIONS 
There is a relationship of mutual trust that must exist between soldiers and 
the people they serve. In order to sustain strong bonds of mutual trust, soldiers 
must earn the respect of the citizenry through competence and fidelity. At the 
same time, the soldiers must be provided adequate material and psychological 
support to carry out the mission. Right now, the Philippine military has the 
support of the government, but is lacking the necessary tools (i.e., training, airlift, 
transportation, advanced weapons, etc.) required to successfully defeat the CPP-
NPA. Additionally, while subordinated to civilian authority, the military lacks 
fidelity by continually undermining the government’s legitimacy through 
demonstrations and coup attempts whenever they feel slighted rather than 
pressing the issue up the chain of command. In addition, there is a noticeable 
lack of stiff penalties for military insubordination that subverts the implementation 
of government policies. For example, to date, many of the Oakwood mutineers 
remain free and were granted pardons for their involvement after issuing a public 
apology to the president.  
This sends the message to the public that there are no repercussions to 
military insubordination as troops can rebel one day and go back to work the 
next. This has provided the CPP-NPA with another weapon in their arsenal—
exploitation of public perception. For example, as Philippine citizens come to 
view the government as illegitimate or flawed each time the military launches a 
demonstration or coup and sees that those individuals are not punished for their 
behavior, the CPP-NPA are likely able to exploit this sentiment and draw in 
additional supporters to overthrow the government. 
C. CORRUPTION 
The Philippines has a robust anti-corruption infrastructure in place; 
however, the problem of eliminating corruption lies not with these organizations, 
but rather with Philippine society’s own desire to eliminate corrupt practices. The 
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problem is that the concept of utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and pakikisama 
(getting along well with others) have been abused to the point that public and 
private sectors are rife with corruption. It is commonplace and even accepted 
behavior for Filipinos to foster and build interpersonal relationships by bribing 
officials in exchange for basic civil services or assisting friends and family to get 
jobs or construction contracts. From a Filipino perspective, there is nothing wrong 
with this behavior. It is simply seen as a way to exist in modern society. Unless 
this behavior is eliminated by Filipinos themselves, the Philippines will continue 
to suffer from widespread corruption with the organizations already in place to 
combat corruption continuing to be tasked with the amelioration of this problem. 
In the end, the system that is supposed to provide basic services for the 
military and the civilian population is abused which results in economic 
underdevelopment to the tune of millions in lost revenue and a reputation of 
national weakness. The effect this has had on the state’s ability to combat the 
communist insurgency is readily apparent. Money siphoned from the state’s 
coffers by senior military officers lines their pockets and those of their families 
instead of being used to fund military modernization programs. The lost revenue 
hinders the military’s ability to conduct successful operations because it remains 
under-funded and ill-equipped to combat the insurgents. Additionally, as more 
cases alleging corruption by senior military and government officials are brought 
before the OMB and Sandiganbayan, public support and opinion for these 
organizations are further eroded which allows the CPP-NPA to sit back and 
watch the armed forces collapse under the weight of corruption scandals and 
questions of loyalty to the government. 
D. THE BOTTOM LINE 
The CPP-NPA’s desire to come to the bargaining table is currently 
overshadowed by their place on the United States’ list of foreign terrorist 
organizations. The CPP-NPA will not come to the bargaining  table until they are 
taken off the list, and the government will not carry on peace talks because the 
CPP-NPA are on the list and will not come to the negotiating table. Both sides 
are caught in a vicious circle with neither side willing to compromise on its 
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position. In order for a peace process to go forward, concessions must be made 
on both sides. However, the government has repeatedly expressed and overall 
desire to pursue a military solution to the communist insurgency rather than a 
political one. Additionally, the Philippine government has failed to pursue 
measures that would make the expected utility of violence outweigh its 
opportunity cost by making it harder to profit through violence. For example, 
CPP-NPA “revolutionary taxes” are hurting the same people they claim to be 
protecting. This highlights the fact that the CPP-NPA continue to gain from armed 
conflict and would therefore not genuinely seek a resolution to the insurgency 
because they expect to profit more from conflict than from engaging in alternative 
productive activities. 
The CPP-NPA has become the mouthpiece used by the rural peasantry to 
voice their anger and carry on the fight against the Philippine government. As 
Patricio Abinales concludes, “So with the government shooting itself on the foot, 
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